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Abstract 
President Lyndon Johnson’s visit to Australia in October 1966 was the apogee of the 
Australian-American political alliance and coincided with the peak of Australian public 
support for the American war in Vietnam. It was also during this period that Americanisation 
in Australia intensified. This thesis utilises the Johnson visit as a lens onto Australia’s Cold 
War political relationships and cultural loyalties. I argue that Australians’ enthusiastic 
embrace of the president did not reflect either political or cultural subservience, and that 
Australian political and civic culture at this time remained essentially ‘British’.    
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Introduction  
 
 
© David Moore 
 
On the clear, chilly evening of 20 October 1966, President Lyndon Johnson landed in 
Canberra, Australia.
1
 His coming marked the first visit of a serving American president 
to Australia and the penultimate leg of Johnson’s Asia-Pacific tour, which included a 
prior stopover in New Zealand and the subsequent Manila conference in the 
Philippines.
2
 The tour itself was designed to boost regional support for the war in 
Vietnam, but Johnson knew that in Australia he was guaranteed a hero’s welcome.3 His 
three-day visit coincided with the highpoint of Australians’ support for the war against 
communism in Vietnam – a welcome contrast to the increasingly negative opinion of 
the war back home in the United States – and his relationship with Prime Minister 
                                                          
1
 Dame Zara Holt, My Life and Harry: An Autobiography (Melbourne: Herald and Weekly Times, 1968), p. 
183.  
2
 John Rickard, Australia: A Cultural History (New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 2
nd
 edition, 1996), p. 210;  
Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency 1963–1969 (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, 1971), p. 360.  
3
 Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. 360.  
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Harold Holt was already well established.
4
 When Holt travelled to Washington in July 
that same year, he made a now famous speech on the South lawn of the White House.
5
 
Appropriating the 1964 Democratic election campaign slogan, the prime minister told 
Johnson that in Australia ‘you have an admiring friend, a staunch ally that will be “All 
the Way with LBJ”’.6 For this statement, the Australian press and opposition Labor 
party fired a barrage of criticisms at Holt, deriding him for embarrassing the nation with 
such a ‘crass’ expression of obsequiousness.7 Johnson, however, reportedly found the 
comment amusing.
8
 It has nevertheless come to symbolise a particular style of 
Australian alliance management, one which gave Australia little freedom of movement, 
let alone independence.        
 
Much like the worlds contained in photographs themselves, the historiography of the 
Australian-American alliance under the stewardship of Johnson and Holt has become 
ossified in the hands of scholars unable or unwilling to move beyond the metaphor that 
has been extrapolated from David Moore’s photograph.9 Thus Holt, squat in stature, is 
seen as solemnly genuflecting to the hulking back of his powerful ally, ready and eager 
to obey the president’s bidding. This interpretation has been reflected time and again in 
the literature. Academics such as Robin Gerster and Jan Bassett, Alison Broinowski and 
Erik Paul, and commentators Donald Horne and Don Watson have claimed that 
                                                          
4
 For figures on public support for the Vietnam War see Australian Gallup Polls nos. 1820–2131 in Neville 
Meaney, ed., Australia and the World: A Documentary History from the 1870s to the 1970s (Melbourne: 
Longman Cheshire, 1985), p. 702. For figures on domestic ratings of President Johnson in the United States see 
Fred I. Greenstein, The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to Barack Obama (Woodstock: 
Princeton University Press, 3
rd
 edition, 2009), p. 83. On Harold Holt and Johnson’s relationship see Dennis L. 
Cuddy, ‘The American Role in Australian Involvement in the Vietnam War’, Australian Journal of Politics and 
History, vol. 28, no. 3 (December 1982), p. 345.  
5
 Tom Frame, The Life and Death of Harold Holt (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2005), p. 181.   
6
 Harold Holt, 1966, in Alan J Whiticker, Speeches that Reshaped the World (Sydney: New Holland, 2009), pp. 
38-39.  
7
 Frame, The Life and Death of Harold Holt, pp. 182-183. 
8
 Ibid., p. 183.  
9
 Rickard, Australia, p. 211.  
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Australia in the Cold War became not only strategically dependent on the United States 
but also culturally subservient to its powerful friend.
10
 Although Johnson’s travels of the 
east Australian coast from 20 to 23 October 1966 have often been neglected by 
historians, Gerster and Bassett as well as Horne have interpreted Australians’ dramatic 
show of affection for Johnson as epitomising their total embrace of Americana.
11
 
Through an examination of Johnson’s tour, this thesis presents a counterargument: that 
the harmony of interests between Australian and American approaches to dealing with 
Asian communism was not accompanied by Australians’ desire to become culturally 
American, and that Australian civic and political culture in the mid- to late-1960s 
remained essentially British.  
 
To date, historians of the Australian-American alliance have tended to focus largely on 
the close alignment of Australia’s foreign policy with its ‘great and powerful friend’ in 
the Cold War. But as historian David McLean has emphasised, serious attention has not 
yet been paid to the cultural dimension of this strategic relationship.
12
 This trend in the 
historiography is surprising given that policymaking does not operate in a vacuum, but 
is instead shaped by a nation’s ‘cultural baggage’.13 Political leaders, after all, are 
creatures of their culture and must seek a popular mandate for their policy agendas and 
programs. We err if we place an artificial fault line between political ‘elites’ and the 
                                                          
10
 See Robin Gerster and Jan Bassett, Seizures of Youth: Australia in the Sixties (Melbourne: Hyland House, 
1991); Alison Broinowski, Allied and Addicted (Carlton North: Scribe, 2007); Erik Paul, Little America: 
Australia, the 51
st
 State (London: Pluto Press, 2006); Donald Horne, Time of Hope: Australia 1966–1972 
(Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1980); Don Watson, ‘Rabbit Syndrome: Australia and America’, Quarterly 
Essay, vol. 4 (2001), pp. 1-59.   
11
 Gerster and Bassett, Seizures of Youth, pp. 33-35; Horne, Time of Hope, p. 170.  
12
 David McLean, ‘Australia in the Cold War: A Historiographical Review’, International History Review, vol. 
23, no. 2 (June 2001), p. 315. James Curran has recently written on Johnson’s visit to Australia, but this thesis 
has taken the topic in different directions. See James Curran, ‘Beyond the Euphoria: Lyndon Johnson in 
Australia and the Politics of the Cold War Alliance’, in Joan Beaumont and Matthew Jordan, eds., Australia and 
the World: A Festschrift for Neville Meaney (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 2013), pp. 217-235.  
13
 ‘McLean, ‘Australia in the Cold War’, p. 317.  
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people they seek to represent.
14
 For Australian governments and the Australian 
community at large, the question of cultural inheritance was of paramount concern in 
the 1960s.
15
 This question was inextricably linked to how Australia saw its role in the 
world and its relations with what many still affectionately referred to as the ‘mother 
country’ – Britain – and America. By the mid-1960s Australia had become fully 
integrated into America’s defence nexus, a process which began in the late 1950s with 
Australia’s reorganisation of its armed forces to facilitate closer military cooperation 
with its Pacific neighbour, and with the agreement of the Menzies government to the 
construction of American intelligence installations on Australian soil.
16
 With Prime 
Minister Robert Menzies’ April 1965 commitment of an Australian battalion to Vietnam 
– the first war in which Australia fought without Britain – the nation’s foreign policy 
revolution, from seeking protection under the wing of the ‘mother country’ to keeping 
the Americans locked in Southeast Asia, was complete.
17
 At this time, as a consequence 
of Britain’s announcement that it would commence a military withdrawal from the 
region, and the solidification of America as Australia’s defence backbone, the 
Americanisation of Australian culture intensified.
18
 This presents an important historical 
problem for Australians. Did the collapse of the British empire lead to a weakening of 
identification with Britain and the British world? Did Australians simply switch their 
cultural affections from Britain to America in line with the changing strategic 
                                                          
14
  James Curran and Stuart Ward, ‘Introduction’, in James Curran and Stuart Ward, eds., Australia and the 
Wider World: Selected Essays of Neville Meaney (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 2013), p. 3.  
15
 Rickard, Australia, pp. 204-207.  
16
 Gregory Pemberton, All the Way: Australia’s Road to Vietnam (North Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1987), p. 67.  
17
 David Goldsworthy, Losing the Blanket: Australia and the End of Britain’s Empire (Carlton South: 
Melbourne University Press, 2002), p. 157.  
18
 Jeppe Kristensen, ‘“In Essence still a British Country”: Britain’s Withdrawal from East of Suez’, Australian 
Journal of Politics and History, vol. 51, no. 1 (March 2005), pp. 40-52; Richard White, ‘A Backwater Awash: 
The Australian Experience of Americanisation’, Theory, Culture and Society, vol. 1 no. 3 (January 1983), p. 
108.  
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circumstances? This thesis is an attempt to deal with these issues: what McLean has 
called ‘the larger questions raised by Australia’s [Cold War] experience’.19      
 
Marriage of the strategic and cultural aspects of foreign relations is afforded by the 
expanded role of diplomatic history in recent years. In historian Thomas Zeiler’s view, 
diplomatic history ‘reminds us of the significant presence of the state’ but can also 
merge this focus with ‘transnational actors… and other measures of the cultural turn’.20 
Thus this thesis has taken multiple approaches in its examination of Johnson’s 
Australian tour. Although a study of Australia’s cultural loyalty in the mid- to late-
1960s is an exercise in national history, the state interacted with forces originating 
outside the nation, notably Britishness and Americanisation. It is also the intention of 
this thesis to contribute to the growing number of revisionist histories that consider 
‘how America’s overseas audiences (both governments and people) shaped… [and] 
resisted… the process of Americanisation’.21 Australians’ agency in the negotiation of 
American hegemony was found in the Holt government’s decision-making over 
Vietnam troop commitments as well as in the actions of dissenting Australians 
throughout the president’s visit who opposed the dominant perceptions of the Vietnam 
conflict in America and Australia. Moreover, the  recent opening up of diplomatic 
history – one which stresses the variety of factors influencing policy formation other 
than what is mined at the archives – has enabled a greater focus on the interplay 
between the forces of  nationalism, theories of international relations and the influence 
of popular culture.
22
 Explored here is not only the use of power by the United States and 
indeed Australia, but also the limits of this power, which had consequences for 
                                                          
19
 McLean, ‘Australia in the Cold War’, p. 317.  
20
 Thomas Zeiler, ‘The Diplomatic History Bandwagon: A State of the Field’, Journal of American History, vol. 
95, no. 4 (March 2009), pp. 1055-1056.  
21
 ‘Ibid.’, p. 1060.  
22
 ‘Ibid.’, p. 1073.  
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American might and the re-formation of Australia’s self-image following the 
abandonment of racial nationalism in the 1960s.
23
   
 
The source material underpinning this dissertation reflects a multidimensional approach 
to Johnson’s visit. The online archive The American Presidency Project has made 
available the official speeches of Johnson in Australia, whilst audio recordings of Holt’s 
speeches during the tour were found in the National Library of Australia. 
Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates have delineated the coalition government’s and 
opposition Labor party’s views on Australia’s and America’s roles in the Vietnam 
conflict. Diplomatic files were selected from archives in Australia, the United Kingdom 
and the United States. In demonstrating the nature of the media coverage of the 
president’s visit, it was important to consider a broad Australian readership. The 
integration of broadsheet newspapers, tabloids and women’s magazines has exposed the 
spectrum of views of the president’s Australian journey. Finally, the Dr Kenneth 
Macnab collection in Fisher Library at the University of Sydney has provided a local 
perspective on the logic behind the anti-Vietnam protests in Australia and identified the 
types of participants of these demonstrations.       
 
In trying to divine the influence of the Johnson visit on Australian loyalties, it is 
important to highlight the comparative context in which his visit was often placed. The 
experience of the American Commander in Chief in Australia and the reception he 
received had only one precedent: British royal tours. Australians have reacted with 
similar energy but for different reasons to the presence of British royalty and Americans 
                                                          
23
 On the demise of racial nationalism in Australia in the 1960s, see Neville Meaney, ‘Britishness and Australian 
Identity: The Problem of Nationalism in Australian History and Historiography’, Australian Historical Studies, 
vol. 32, no. 116 (April 2001), pp. 76-90. On the reformation of Australia’s image in the post-imperial era, see 
James Curran and Stuart Ward, The Unknown Nation: Australia after Empire (Carlton: Melbourne University 
Press, 2010).  
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in their nation. The first chapter therefore begins by focussing on the importance of 
Royal tours and state visits for historians, followed by the historiographical and 
contextual background to the American presidential visit. The next three chapters 
consider Johnson’s time in the country from different angles. Chapter Two examines the 
policies adopted by the Johnson government in Washington, and the Holt government 
and Labor party in Australia towards the Vietnam War. It will show that the Holt 
government was not in fact ‘all the way with LBJ’ in its commitment to Vietnam. 
Rather, it aimed to use the American alliance to serve Australia’s national interests. The 
subsequent chapter entitled ‘People’ explores the preparations for and the proceedings 
of the visit itself. Here the anti-Vietnam War and anti-American protests and 
demonstrations show that the Australian community was not totally enamoured of all 
things American. Finally, the study turns its attention to the question of Australia’s 
cultural loyalty in the mid- to late-1960s, when the demise of racial Britishness left 
Australian politicians and culture-makers scrambling for a new language of community. 
The argument here is that the penetration of American culture in Australian life, which 
occurred particularly at the popular level, was not a result of aggressive American 
imperialism dominating its passive junior ally. Nor was it a result of the failure of the 
‘new nationalists’ to define the parameters of a more authentic Australian nationalism. 
On the contrary, Australians mediated American culture at all levels of social class, and 
their general fondness for American-inspired ideas and lifestyles did not erode their 
attachment to Britishness, even at a time when that very idea of ‘being British’ was 
undergoing reappraisal.     
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Chapter One: Historiography  
 
Royal tours and state visits 
 
In recent years historians have given increasing attention to the powerful imagery and 
symbolism that accompany a Royal tour or state visit. Not content to see in these events a 
simple panorama of pageantry or surface-level hysteria, they have instead investigated how 
such occasions present an opportunity to study both the visitor and host: in essence, to 
capture a snapshot of the nation. Historians Jane Connors, Neville Meaney, John Rickard and 
Stuart Ward have noted that irrespective of political affiliation, Australians showed feverish 
public enthusiasm for Queen Elizabeth II’s tour in early 1954.24 These comments, which have 
been cited as witnesses to Australians’ powerful attachment to Britishness, have mainly 
formed part of broader enquiries on Australia’s relationships with Britain.25 Jane Connors’ 
specific study of the 1954 Royal tour to Australia has encouraged historians to consider why 
the Queen’s visit was so ‘remarkably popular’ and met with so little publicly articulated 
opposition.
26
 Whereas Connors has asked whether there were clear benefits to laying eyes on 
the Queen for Australians, visits by a head of state have been conveyed by historians as tools 
of diplomacy of benefit to both the host and visiting nations.
27
 Thus academic Erik Goldstein 
has suggested that the host nation’s government, through careful planning of its reception of a 
                                                          
24
 Jane Connors, ‘The 1954 Royal Tour of Australia’, Australian Historical Studies, vol. 25, no. 100 (April 
1993), pp. 372-373; Meaney, ‘Britishness and Australian Identity’, pp. 204-205; Rickard, Australia, pp. 204-
205; Stuart Ward, Australia and the British Embrace: The Demise of the Imperial Ideal (Carlton South: 
Melbourne University Press, 2001), p. 24.  
25
 One book has been dedicated to the first Royal tour to Australia, that of Prince Alfred, but it is largely a 
narrative recount. See Brian McKinlay, The First Royal Tour 1867 – 1868 (Sydney: Rigby, 1970). David 
Lowe’s article on the 1954 Royal tour was mainly concerned with the tour’s international context. See David 
Lowe, ‘1954: The Queen and Australia in the World’, Australian Historical Studies, vol. 19, no. 46 (September 
1995), pp. 1-10.   
26
 Connors, ‘The 1954 Royal Tour of Australia’, p. 379.  
27
 ‘Ibid.’, p. 371.  
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foreign head of state, is able to project a desired image of their community.
28
 Similarly, 
historian Mike Cronin has viewed the state visit, with its accompanying media attention, as a 
vehicle for shaping international perceptions of the participating nations.
29
 Moreover, as an 
exercise in ‘public diplomacy’, the state visit enables the touring leader to ‘communicate with 
foreign publics as a method of heightening an understanding of [the visiting nation’s] aims 
and policies’.30 However, the use of the state visit for promoting a nation’s ideological 
outlook does not necessarily make it a stage in the treaty-signing process. Rather, as 
Goldstein has noted, these events are ‘atmospheric and psychological’.31 This focus on the 
emotional impact of the state visit means that the organisation of spectacle as well as the 
visiting leader’s public interactions with the host government and citizens often take priority 
over private discussion.
32
 Lyndon Johnson’s people-oriented approach and affable nature on 
his vice presidential travels throughout the Third World, although they engendered criticism 
by some American State Department officials who accompanied Johnson, have been hailed 
by historian Mitchell Lerner as ‘the driving force behind a fairly successful effort to convey a 
message of solidarity and empathy to the common people of the non-Western world’.33 At the 
height of the Cold War, such interactions were of acute importance, as though the visits 
themselves were times to present rival ideologies and ways of life. Johnson used public 
appearances as well as private conferences during state visits on his October 1966 Asia-
Pacific tour to shore up support for the war in Vietnam, alerting Australia and other anti-
communist Asian nations that America required further contributions of assistance in that 
                                                          
28
 Erik Goldstein, ‘The Politics of the State Visit’, Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 3, no. 1 (March 2008), p. 
159.  
29
 Mike Cronin, ‘“Ireland is an Unusual Place”: President Kennedy’s 1963 Visit and the Complexity of 
Recognition’, in Thomas Hachey, ed., Turning Points in Twentieth-Century Irish History (Dublin: Irish 
Academic Press, 2011), p. 122.  
30
 ‘“Ibid.”’, p. 121.  
31
 Goldstein, ‘The Politics of the State Visit’, p. 169.  
32
 ‘Ibid.’, p. 176.  
33
 Mitchell Lerner, ‘“A Big Tree of Peace and Justice”: The Vice Presidential Travels of Lyndon Johnson’, 
Diplomatic History, vol. 34, no. 2 (April 2010), p. 387; p. 393.   
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theatre.
34
 In sum, close examination of Royal tours and state visits can assist historians in 
diagnosing the health of relations between the visiting and host nations, and can shed light on 
broader questions about Cold War alliances and allegiances.  
 
The alliance: Historical schools of thought 
 
As previously noted, Johnson’s October 1966 tour marked the first visit of a serving 
American president to Australia, and has been deemed the highpoint of the Australian-
American alliance.
35
 But this was not the first instance in which the coming of the 
Americans’ representative generated a near frenzied response from Australians. A similar 
reaction bordering on hysteria greeted the arrival of sixteen American navy vessels – part of 
President Theodore Roosevelt’s Great White Fleet – at Sydney and Melbourne in August 
1908, with the occasion witnessing the budding relationship based on common culture and 
strategic interests between the two Pacific nations.
36
 Many Australians were also fervently 
excited by the stationing of hundreds of thousands of male and female American war-service 
personnel in Australia during the Second World War.
37
 That Johnson’s visit came at the peak 
of Australian public support for America’s war in Vietnam has in itself coloured the way 
historians and commentators have interpreted the significance of the event. These 
interpretations and wider views of the observers of the Australian-American alliance can be 
grouped into three schools of thought.  
 
                                                          
34
 George C. Herring, LBJ and Vietnam: A Different Kind of War (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994), p. 
139.  
35
 David McLean, ‘From British Colony to American Satellite?’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 
52, no. 1 (February 2006), p. 73.  
36
 Neville Meaney, The Search for Security in the Pacific: 1901–1914 (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1976), 
p. 163.  
37
 Philip Bell and Roger Bell, Implicated: The United States in Australia (South Melbourne: Oxford University 
Press, 1993), p. 101.  
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The radical nationalist school, like other historians writing in the nationalist tradition of 
history, assumes a teleological view of nationalism. That is, the belief that the nation state is 
set on an inevitable path to nationhood which will culminate in the realisation of a distinctive, 
independent national community.
38
 Radical nationalists have viewed Australia’s supposedly 
uncritical dependence on Britain and then America as obstacles to the achievement of full 
national maturity.
39
  This habit of reliance was embarrassing for historian Humphrey 
McQueen, who summarised Australia’s international allegiances in this period with the rather 
colourful statement that Prime Minister Robert Menzies ‘switched from British sycophant to 
American lickspittle’.40 Historian Stephen Alomes similarly lamented the ‘further default of 
Australian nationhood’ as foreign investment from Britain and later America inhibited the 
‘growing social and cultural assertion’ of Australia’s national impulse in the 1960s.41 
Nowhere was Australian dependence more evident, for historians Robin Gerster and Jan 
Bassett, than in Australians’ reception of President Johnson. Following Australia’s swap of 
its ‘political bondage’ to the Union Jack for stars and stripes in World War Two, the spirited 
embrace of the president encapsulated ‘Australia’s love affair with America’.42 For these 
historians the Johnson visit confirmed that Australians were unable to distinguish their 
national destiny from that of their so-called ‘great and powerful’ friend. 
 
                                                          
38
 Neville Meaney, ‘Britishness and Australia: Some Reflections’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth 
History, vol. 31, no.2 (May 2003), p. 122; Meaney, ‘Britishness and Australian Identity’, p. 77. Radical 
nationalists view the Labor party and participants of the labour movement as forerunners in pursuit of 
independent foreign policy-making, which, as McLean has noted, is seen as a pre-requisite for Australian 
nationalism. See McLean, ‘From British Colony to American Satellite?’, p. 66.   
39
 David Day, for example, has bemoaned the curtailment of an Australian policy agenda and outlook by a 
‘dependent mentality’. This mindset of Australia’s political elite meant that there was no struggle to escape the 
clutches of the ‘imperial master’. In Day’s view, Australian governments were content with their pusillanimity; 
its leaders had lacked the courage to generate ‘policies based on a clear appreciation of national interest’.  See 
David Day, Reluctant Nation: Australia and the Allied Defeat of Japan 1942–1945 (South Melbourne: Oxford 
University Press, 1992), pp. 314-316.  
40
 Humphrey McQueen, Gallipoli to Petrov: Arguing with Australian History (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1984), 
p. 174.   
41
 Stephen Alomes, A Nation at Last? The Changing Character of Australian Nationalism, 1880–1988 (Sydney: 
Angus & Robertson, 1988), p. 176; p. 178.  
42
 Gerster and Bassett, Seizures of Youth, pp. 32-33.  
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Another interpretation has been to stress Australia’s limited freedom of movement within the 
alliance. Rather than emphasising Australian subservience this school promotes the 
perspective that Australian governments believed they needed to make insurance payments in 
return for protection from America.
43
 The traditional view of the formation of the ANZUS 
treaty, signed by Australia, New Zealand and the United States in 1951, is found in historian 
Thomas Bruce Millar’s statement that America ‘acquiesced only with reluctance’.44 Millar 
claimed that although ANZUS offered the impetus for American administrations’ ‘sense of 
commitment to Australia’, he also noted that the Australians were ‘conscious of the need to 
pull their weight’ so that America would feel obliged to protect Australia.45 Highlighting 
Australians’ sense of accountability to America, historian Glen St J. Barclay has equated 
Johnson’s trip to that by a ‘chairman of the board checking up on his branch managers’.46 
The endpoint of Millar’s and Barclay’s analysis that Australian governments had to work 
hard to commit America to Australia’s defence was that the Australian government had little 
choice but to support the American war in Vietnam.
47
 As a show of ‘gratitude’, to use 
historian Peter Edwards’ term, Johnson repaid the government and Harold Holt in particular 
with a three-day American-style presidential tour during which Johnson turned Holt’s ‘all the 
way’ ‘gaffe’ into a ‘political asset’.48  
 
The flaws inherent in both the radical nationalist and insurance premium schools have been 
underlined by historian David McLean. Contrary to the radical nationalist proposition, 
Australian governments’ avoidance of public disagreements with the United States did not 
                                                          
43
 See Thomas Bruce Millar, Australia in Peace and War: External Relations since 1788 (Canberra: Australian 
National University Press, 1978); Peter Edwards, A Nation at War: Australian Politics, Society and Diplomacy 
during the Vietnam War 1965–1975 (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1997); Gregory Pemberton, All the Way: 
Australia’s Road to Vietnam (North Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1987).   
44
 Millar, Australia in Peace and War, p. 207.    
45
 Ibid., p. 209.  
46
 Glen St J. Barclay, Friends in High Places. Australian-American Diplomatic Relations since 1945 
(Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 157.  
47
 McLean, ‘Australia in the Cold War’, p. 304.  
48
 Edwards, A Nation at War, p. 114.  
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equate to servility. Instead, McLean has argued, Australian leaders where they could aimed to 
utilise their relationship with America in pursuit of Australia’s national interests and most 
importantly its regional security.
49
 Far from being a reluctant warrior in the fight against 
communism in South East Asia, McLean has emphasised that Australian governments 
pressed the Americans to continue the fight.
50
 Keeping the Americans engaged in the region 
was the main pillar of Australia’s Cold War foreign policy.51 Such evidence undercuts the 
assertion that the obsequious characters in Australian governments, Holt being the guiltiest 
offender, extended the nation’s adolescence and entrenched its subservient tendencies by 
holding hostage Australia’s faculty for independent thinking. The theory that Australia’s 
Vietnam commitment was an insurance payment for American protection is equally 
problematic for McLean, given that at the height of the commitment, Australian troops 
numbered eight thousand – a token force – even after Johnson had privately criticised the 
Holt government on his Australian tour for not carrying a heavier load in the conflict.
52
 
Barclay’s opinion that Johnson ‘had done everything in his power to make it impossible’ for 
Holt to avoid enlarging Australia’s Vietnam military contingent has presented Holt as 
confined to limited options in the alliance.
53
 But it was not imperative for Holt to respond 
favourably to the Americans. None of America’s European allies in SEATO, save for New 
Zealand, sent troops, with no real consequence dealt to them by the American government, 
but Holt’s decision to increase troop numbers in relatively modest increments aimed to 
placate the American administration at the lowest possible cost to Australia.
54
  
 
                                                          
49
 McLean, ‘Australia in the Cold War’, p. 310.  
50
 ‘Ibid.’, p. 312.  
51
 ‘Ibid.’, p. 320.  
52
 ‘Ibid.’, p. 312.  
53
 Barclay, Friends in High Places, p. 162.  
54
 Neville Meaney, 1993, cited in McLean, ‘Australia in the Cold War’, p. 312.  
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An alternative interpretation of Australia’s security alliances has been offered by McLean and 
historian Neville Meaney. Despite the closeness of the relationships with both Britain and 
America in cultural and sentimental terms, Australian leaders have always prioritised their 
own nation’s security interests, which of course were directly related to their geographical 
position in the Pacific.
55
 As McLean has noted, Australia’s search since Federation for a 
security agreement with its Pacific power friend, America, must be seen in light of the 
Australian political elite’s nagging conviction that Britain could not empathise with or 
provide for Australia’s regional insecurities in the Asia Pacific.56 However this hunt for a 
guarantee of American protection in the absence of Britain’s ability to offer such a promise 
was not to forsake Australia’s cultural Britishness.57 From the perspective of this school, 
evaluations of the significance of President Johnson’s Australian tour must take into account 
that Australian governments had been conditioned over time to expect dissatisfaction and 
frustration in their relations with their powerful allies. As a small- to middle-power, Australia 
had been disappointed by Britain, for example in Britain’s inability to defend Singapore in 
1942, and suspicious of the United States on the basis that it was not a British nation and 
therefore unobligated to come to Australia’s aid.58 The tangible presence of the president, 
then, signalled the crescendo of decades of hard work dedicated to yoking Australia’s 
security with America’s for the advantage of the smaller power. 
 
                                                          
55
 Meaney, ‘Britishness and Australian Identity’, pp. 84-89; McLean, ‘From British Colony to American 
Satellite?’, p. 78. This argument contradicts Joseph Camilleri’s view that Australian governments took no issue 
with blindly following American policies and Cold War perceptions ‘with little or no thought to their 
consequences for Australia or the region’ and also Lloyd G. Churchward’s perception of Australia as a US 
‘satellite’.  See Joseph Camilleri, Australian-American Relations: The Web of Dependence (Melbourne: 
Macmillan, 1980), p. 10; Lloyd G. Churchward, Australia and America, 1788–1972, An Alternative History 
(Sydney: Alternative Publishing, 1979), p. 169.  
56
 McLean, ‘From British Colony to American Satellite?’, p. 71.  
57
 ‘Ibid.’, pp. 71-72. Meaney has argued that ‘Australian leaders down to the 1960s remained true to their 
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A ‘historic shift of policy’: Australia’s self-image in 1966 
 
The timing of Johnson’s visit was as important for historians as the occasion itself for gaining 
an indication of how Australia viewed the United States, itself and the fate of its cultural 
future. Australia in the 1960s underwent significant domestic changes as old shibboleths were 
jettisoned in an unstable international environment.
59
 The onset of global decolonisation in 
Africa and Asia, the potential withdrawal of Britain’s troops east of Suez and Britain’s 
attempts at joining the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1961 and 1963 had 
dramatic implications for Australia’s defence arrangements and the substance of its 
nationalism.
60
 Not only was Australia faced with a seemingly hostile region without the 
buffer of a British military presence, but Australian politicians and policy makers had also 
acknowledged the redundancy and undesirability of their racially discriminative national 
myth.
61
 Lyndon Johnson himself viewed this ‘historic shift of policy’ in Australia as ‘a 
profound, and doubtless painful, readjustment’ of the country’s self-image.62 His visit in 1966 
is therefore an important moment in which historians can endeavour to chart the course of a 
changing Australia.    
 
Stresses and strains in the Anglo-Australian alliance in the 1960s exacerbated Australia’s 
need for an American military body in Southeast Asia. For historians James Curran and 
Stuart Ward, the most profound shock to the Menzies government’s conceptions about the 
nature of the Commonwealth came early in the decade, with the Macmillan government’s 
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application to enter the EEC in July 1961.
63
 Britain’s move roused the pervasive feeling 
within the Australian government, parliament and public that the Macmillan government was 
‘breaking some imagined code of British conduct’.64 Additionally historian Jeppe Kristensen 
has shown that Australia and Britain differed in their approaches to Indonesia’s waging of 
Konfrontasi against the Malaysia Federation as well as to Vietnam, to which Britain refused 
to send troops.
65
 Despite Britain’s turn to Europe, historian David Goldsworthy has argued 
that the British were nevertheless unwelcoming of the fact that by 1965 ‘Australia’s key 
strategic alliance was with the United States’.66 From the Australian perspective, despite 
repeated warnings that Britain was about to reassess its defence commitments east of Suez, 
when the decision was finally announced in April 1967 a lingering sense of ‘hurt’ and even 
‘betrayal’ was felt by Australian policy makers.67 Divergent interests had finally dashed the 
persistent hope, often unfulfilled, that Britain would always be able to come to Australia’s 
aid.  
 
A more constrained British role in the world had far-reaching consequences for the American 
and therefore the Australian efforts in Vietnam. Historian Jeremy Fielding has shown that the 
Johnson administration viewed its prospects in Vietnam as contingent upon the strength of 
Britain’s economy, which was in tatters throughout the 1960s despite measures taken by 
America to ‘bail out’ the pound.68 Saving the British economy was of paramount concern for 
the Americans who required continued British presence not only in Southeast Asia but also in 
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the Middle East to avoid ‘strategic vacuums’ America would need to fill.69  In the event that 
Britain could not afford these ventures, and the United States administration judged its 
military resources to be stretched too thin given Britain’s waning global presence, the degree 
of Australia’s own commitment to Vietnam would be implicated.70  
 
The disintegration of the British empire under the twin pressures of the era of decolonisation 
and a sliding British economy also undermined the racial dimension of Australian 
Britishness. Meaney has established that from the late nineteenth century down to the 1960s 
Australians thought of themselves primarily as a ‘British’ people.71 The idea was manifested 
in Australian institutions and civic culture, and in the public rhetoric of both Labor and 
Liberal party politicians.
72
 Although kinship ties existed with Britons around the world, for 
instance in the United Kingdom and Canada, Australians and New Zealanders saw 
themselves as ‘better Britons’ – to borrow CEW Bean’s phrase – with their combined 
English, Irish, Scottish and Welsh blood.
73
 Under the weight of the new circumstances in 
which Britain cut loose its colonial associations and the British race idea collapsed, peoples 
belonging to the Commonwealth who defined themselves as ethnically and culturally 
‘British’ were forced to deal with a widely-perceived sense of emptiness and dislocation.74 
From the late 1950s many in the Liberal government, including Menzies and Holt, began 
expressing the need to reconsider the racially restrictive White Australia policy in order that 
Australia would cease offending her Asian neighbours and to avoid reproach from the 
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international community.
75
 In historian Matthew Jordan’s view, the eventual decision in 1966 
to admit non-Europeans into Australia spoke of a redefinition of the ideal Australia along 
socially and culturally homogeneous lines rather than racial ones.
76
  
 
But even as this change was implemented, Australian leaders were reluctant to abandon the 
old language and symbols of Australians’ civic culture, a symptom of their inability to 
imagine themselves as anything other than ‘British’. Australians had not made the choice to 
disassociate themselves from empire. Rather, as Holt confessed in 1966, Australia had been 
‘jolted by events to adulthood’, and the onset of this transition phase would prove to be 
awkward and uncomfortable indeed.
77
 To make the process of discarding the British race 
myth more problematic, by this period nationalism as a unifying social idea had lost much of 
its appeal.
78
 The attempt at national renewal by Australian officials and intelligentsia 
therefore had to travel a somewhat tricky and hazardous path in delivering a sense of 
community whilst weaving around the more aggressive and chauvinistic ideas of national 
self-belonging.
79
 With the demise of Britishness, Australians found themselves anxiously 
searching for a new idea of the nation but uncertain about its location.
80
 There seemed to be 
no ready-made national myth to call upon to define a post-imperial community.  
 
Some politicians and commentators reached for the concept of a  ‘new nationalism’ to define 
Australia’s emergence from the imperial orbit, but in a period when nationalism was 
perceived to be increasingly obsolete, and as Australia was discarding its old white racial 
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identity, this was a fraught exercise.
81
 Viewing with alarm the apparent emptiness of national 
sentiment given that Britishness had theoretically been drained from it, Australian politicians 
and policymakers became determined to fill the so-called identity void.
82
 Unlike previous 
moments of supposed Australian cultural nationalism in the 1890s and 1940s, historian Stuart 
Ward has shown that governments in the 1960s actually legislated to bolster what they saw as 
the flimsy foundations of Australian nationhood, evident in the establishment in 1967 of the 
Australian Council for the Arts.
83
 Ideas of how to communicate Australia’s uniqueness were 
found to be unsatisfactory or non-existent, which was seen during the change to decimal 
currency predicament of 1963. Here, the community voiced outrage over the possibility of 
the new currency being called the ‘Royal’ but could not suggest home-grown substitutes that 
would be taken seriously.
84
 Holt himself could not avoid resorting to the ‘postcard stereotype’ 
of Australia – ‘our gum trees and our kangaroos’ – in his satellite broadcast for the 1967 
Montreal Universal and International Exhibition.
85
 The discourse ignited by Australia’s 
newly ambiguous cultural orientation cut across the public domain from the government to 
the arts, but it had shallow depth when it came time to produce viable alternatives to 
Britishness. 
 
With Australia’s foreign policy firmly intertwined with America’s and British race patriotism 
ebbing from Australia’s post-imperial national story, some commentators  felt compelled in 
the mid-1960s to re-examine Australians’ loyalty to the Monarchy and pitch the argument for 
an Australian republic.
86
 Australian leaders clung to the idea of British family membership, 
epitomised by the emblem of the Crown, well into the 1960s, which was seen in their 
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behaviour during Queen Elizabeth II’s 1963 Royal tour.87 Holt was incensed by the lack of 
enthusiasm shown by one church group for Her Majesty’s visit, whilst Prime Minister 
Menzies personally delivered to the Queen the oft-quoted lyric ‘I did but see her passing by, 
and yet I love her till I die’.88 However, according to Don Whitington, the decline in crowd 
sizes for the 1963 Royal tour bore witness to some Australians’ diminishing interest in such 
tours and some disenchantment with the Monarchy.
89
 Of course, any Royal tour simply could 
not have drawn the same crowds relative to population as Queen Elizabeth’s 1954 visit, 
where an estimated three-quarters of Australians saw the Queen at least once.
90
 Whitington 
was among the scholars and journalists who contributed to Geoffrey Dutton’s symposium 
Australia and the Monarchy, published in 1966, which implored Australians to reconsider 
‘where their loyalties lie’ at a time when the Monarchy’s relevance to Australians was 
dwindling.
91
 Dutton beseeched Australia’s leaders to quit their ‘embarrassing’ expressions of 
deference to the Throne and to stand on their ‘own Australian ground’.92 Public intellectual 
Donald Horne suggested that the constitutional shift to a republic would mean Australia 
could no longer evade ‘the question of what Australia was supposed to be about’.93 An 
Australian republic, as historian Mark McKenna has noted, was therefore seen as an essential 
step towards the cessation of cultural dependence on Britain.
94
 Although the pro-republican 
organisations, magazines such as The Bulletin and figures such as Dutton and Horne brought 
the case for an Australian republic into the mainstream, the idea could not ‘gain traction’ in 
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the wider community.
95
 That McKenna’s comprehensive study of Australian republicanism 
omitted reference to Johnson’s visit demonstrates that it had no measurable impact either on 
the proponents of republicanism or Australians’ dedication to the cause.96 In fact it was 
possible that the Royal tour of April 1970 restored the place of the Queen in the public 
imagination.
97
 Even as outcries of fervent loyalty to the Monarchy receded, and the ability of 
the Monarchy as an overseas institution to nourish an endemic Australian identity faded, 
Australians saw no need to fully detach themselves from the symbolism of empire. In this 
way, Australia remained starkly different to America.   
 
‘…sparkling, neon-lit fun’: Americanisation and Australian culture  
 
Much like the debate over Australia’s political and strategic relationship with the United 
States, the debate over Americanisation has similarly polarised historians and commentators. 
Amidst the worldwide political instability and social ferment of the 1960s, Gerster and 
Bassett have maintained that ‘America became the greatest fashion of all’.98 At this time, 
Alomes saw in Australia a ‘cultural battle’ in full swing.99 Thus although the British 
connection retained importance for tertiary education and the arts, it waned in the area of 
trade.
100
 1966 was the first year that the United States had a higher stake in Australian 
investment than Britain.
101
 Undoubtedly at play at the pinnacle of the Cold War was what 
political scientist Joseph Nye labelled America’s ‘soft power’, a magnetic force which 
projected America overseas as an imagined exemplary democracy and attracted Australians 
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to America’s prescription for spending leisure time.102  In the view of architect and 
commentator Robin Boyd, for Australian teenagers in particular their own ‘stodgy’ culture 
was eclipsed by the ‘exciting, glamorous, sparkling, neon-lit fun’ of American lifestyles.103  
This image of Australian culture as totally overrun by Americanisation has been revised by 
historian Richard White, who has stated that ‘Australian democracy was saved from the worst 
excesses of Americanisation by the fact that it was British’.104 White has shown that, in the 
latter half of the twentieth century, forces shaping Australia which were both modernising 
and Americanising still operated within lingering British cultural frameworks and interacted 
with peculiar local factors such as religion, social class and increasing multiculturalism.
105
 
Historians Philip and Roger Bell have also demonstrated that Australians developed 
‘sometimes nationalistic’ reactions to the ways that modernisation in their country was cast in 
an American mold.
106
 
 
Despite these remarks, there has been no serious examination of whether the alignment of 
Australia’s foreign policy with America in the 1960s resulted in a cultural reorientation that 
replaced Australia’s essential Britishness with Americanness. This gap is one example of the 
tendency noted by McLean for historians to ignore the cultural dimension of foreign 
relations.
107
 Some historians have touched on this question but none have presented sustained 
treatment. White has argued that the new Cold War arrangement ‘seriously threatened’ 
Britishness in Australia, but that the underwriting of Australian civic culture by Britishness 
has endured.
108
 Moreover, Bell and Bell have viewed the continuing, albeit weakened, ties to 
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Britain alongside Australia’s positioning of itself under an American umbrella of strategic 
protection.
109
 The motivating factor for Australia’s alignment with American power in the 
Pacific was the emergence of the communist threat from its Asian neighbours.
110
 As a means 
of erecting bulwarks – which were found in American cultural and economic ideologies – 
against any appealing quality of communism, Australian governments from 1949 sought 
enmeshment into American networks of strategic planning, commerce and consumerism, and 
popular culture.
 111
 More recently, an explicit reference to the cultural ramifications of 
Australia’s alliance with America is found in McLean’s statement that:  
in the 1950s and 1960s, there took place a marked expansion of economic links between 
the two countries and a growth in the influence of American popular culture in 
Australia. But there is no reason to conclude that as a result of these developments 
Australians grew more pro-American in sentiment or more inclined culturally to be 
subservient to the US.
112
  
 
Australians’ general fondness for Americans has been continuous from the beginning of the 
twentieth century through to the Vietnam War years.
113
 The reaction given to President 
Johnson on his 1966 tour has therefore been explained by McLean as a function of this 
constant endearment towards a nation basically similar culturally and additionally capable of 
adopting the role of the Pacific protector – the biggest concern for Australians fearing an 
apparent downward thrust of communism from Asia.
 114
 That same kind of enthusiasm, noted 
above, was clearly evident during the Great White Fleet visit in 1908 and the so called 
American GI ‘invasion’ of Australia during the Second World War.115  
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Expounding their views from a particularly anti-Americanisation platform at the very time 
this process was playing out, Boyd and intellectual Geoffrey Serle worried that with the 
withering away of Australia’s British attachment in the post-imperial era, Australia’s cultural 
lake had been drained dry and would be subsequently swamped by a tidal wave of crass 
Americana. Writing in 1960, Boyd’s book The Australian Ugliness lamented the Australian 
interpretation of American West Coast architectural styles.
116
 Boyd decried the widespread 
development in Australian suburbs of the American-inspired motel, the designs of which 
were considered ‘contemporary’ but were for Boyd nothing short of ghastly.117 Likening the 
flashboard advertising approach and predictable internal design schemes of motels to the 
catchy but shallow ‘carnival symbolism’, Boyd noted this symbolism was transported straight 
from the United States but ‘never [arrived] intact’.118 Although Australia was not alone in its 
supposed desire to model itself on American ‘popular arts and superficial character’, in 
Boyd’s opinion Australia had a particular tendency to appropriate the worst aspects of this 
Americana, which was often set off by the vulgarity that could be described as a distinct 
Australian touch.
119
 Boyd’s term ‘Austerica’ described the peculiar style that resulted when 
‘an austerity version of the American dream overtakes the indigenous culture… it is slightly 
hysterical and it flourishes best of all in Australia’.120 Australia’s vulnerability to displaying 
particularly severe cases of Austerica was for Boyd indicative of the nation’s lack of self-
knowledge and the consequent inability of those responsible for building Australia to create 
anything separately Australian.
121
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Serle in 1967 echoed Boyd’s sentiment by wailing that Australia appeared to ‘capitulate… 
whole-heartedly’ to American influence so that Australians were destined to ‘become just 
slightly different sorts of Americans’.122 Serle contended that most in Britain were not overly 
embracing of Australians and that Americans were closer to Australians in social habits than 
Europeans.
123
 Although this bond located in social practise might have been tolerable for 
Serle, Australia’s new addiction to ‘the gaudy tinsel of progress’, evident in ‘the superficial 
trimmings of American civilisation’, was repugnant.124 American commercial values had 
usurped Australian ones, with scant few voices raised in opposition.
125
 There was no other 
conclusion to be drawn, Serle judged, apart from the inevitable replacement of British 
sentiment with American worship, thus further delaying Australia’s emancipation from 
another great powerful friend.
126
 Serle wondered why Australian leaders had made no effort 
to protect the British connection as a ‘make-weight for dependence on the United Sates’.127 
Serle took aim at the lack of opposition to the imported American methods and designs, 
claiming that Australia should be ashamed that America’s worst features ‘catch on most 
readily’ in the smaller nation.128 To be sure, Serle identified positive aspects of American 
culture, such as its participatory-style democracy, tertiary education standards and quality 
business sector, but found Austerica devoid of any face-saving feature.
129
 The grim outlook 
from Serle’s position was that Australia ‘shall never be self-governing in the full sense’ 
because it was ‘making the transition from a British colony to an American province’.130 
Serle judged, however, that this process would take longer than the ‘local republicans’ 
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expected, and suggested that in a final attempt to stave off a ‘total American embrace’, 
republicans would ironically ‘cling to the Monarchy’.131  
 
Boyd and Serle saw American cultural dominance as incompatible and irreconcilable with the 
pursuit of Australian independence: so long as Australians aimed to remake their image in the 
American design, they could not be truly themselves. Alongside this concern was that 
national independence was reliant on the strength of national identity, the foundations of 
which had been shaken and, as it seemed to Boyd and Serle, hastily repaired with shoddy 
American adhesive.
132
 The post-imperial era created challenges for Australian intelligentsia 
facing the demise of British race patriotism, a process which coincided with an intense inflow 
of American products and ideas, but White has acknowledged the need to focus on 
Americanisation in Australia ‘without the distraction of national myth-making’.133 If this call 
is to be answered, the radical nationalist understanding of the American relationship as an 
impenetrable blockage on the road to realising Australian nationhood must be overturned.   
 
At the heart of this historical problem about Australia’s aspirations for a new identity 
following the dissolution of the British race myth and the establishment of American 
hegemony is the assumption that Australians wanted to ‘go American’ on a fundamental level 
– that American institutions, ideologies, symbols and rituals were seen as suitable examples 
for Australia to emulate. Percy Spender, as Australian Ambassador in the United States from 
1951 to 1958, learnt early in the Cold War that there was little similarity between ‘American 
political culture and historical traditions’ and those of Australia.134 As historian David Lowe 
has pointed out, this familiar ‘institutional tissue’ which was an unwavering point of bondage 
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for Britain and Australia did not feature in the American alliance.
135
  McLean has concluded 
that at the crux of the alliance, regardless of the extent to which Australians latched onto 
American popular culture, was Australians’ perception of America as a ‘foreign country’.136 
It is this view of America that arises through the following analysis of President Johnson’s 
journey through Australia.  
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Chapter Two: Strategy  
 
This chapter focuses on how the Holt government, the Australian Labor party and the 
Johnson administration in Washington DC envisaged Australia’s role in Vietnam in the 
months prior to and then during the president’s visit. The first section provides a framework 
for understanding the rhetoric used by the political leaders at this pivotal moment in the Cold 
War and history of the alliance. The subsequent section considers the issues encountered by 
the Labor party in trying to balance their opposition to the Vietnam War with their 
commitment to the American alliance, a task which reinvigorated an old question in 
Australian politics: which party best exemplified loyalty to the great power protector and thus 
claimed the right to safeguard Australian security? Commentator Donald Horne has argued 
that at this time there was a ‘new faith’ in the nation’s political culture in the form of 
exclusive strategic reliance on America.
137
 No matter how accurate such an observation may 
have been, some Australian leaders did take issue with this new orthodoxy. An examination 
of the rhetorical edifice of the alliance and the tensions within the political community over 
the War has the potential to shed new light on Australia’s experience of the Vietnam War and 
the history of its relationship with America.  
 
A ‘token force’: The Australian commitment to Vietnam  
 
The Liberal-Country party coalition shared the American administration’s understandings 
about communism in Asia and the situation in Vietnam.
138
 The ‘domino theory’ – that 
neighbouring states would fall in quick succession to communist influence imposed by an 
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external aggressor – dominated the Australian government’s assessment of Cold War realities 
in Asia.
139
 China was seen by the Menzies and Holt governments as a nefarious centre of 
communist subversion throughout Asia. External Affairs Minister Paul Hasluck gave voice to 
this belief in expressing the possibility of Peking’s influence in Indonesia, a testament to the 
‘growing power of communist China’.140 The allegedly long-reaching arms of China made 
another appearance in the 29 April 1965 announcement by Prime Minister Robert Menzies 
that an Australian battalion would be sent to fight the Vietcong, whose aim to take over 
Vietnam ‘must be seen as part of a thrust by communist China between the Indian and Pacific 
Oceans’.141 Preying on the popular fears of the public, coalition parliamentarian John Hallett 
asserted that Asian communists not only have ‘territorial ambitions’ but also ‘ambitions to 
rule [the Australian] way of life’.142 Couched in these terms, defence of South Vietnam was 
directly linked to defence of the Australian mainland, but communism was also depicted as a 
monolithic, existential threat to Western culture.
143
  
 
The eagerness of the Holt government to secure the physical presence of the American 
president in Australia is largely explained by Australian governments having been inured 
throughout the nation’s history to anticipate ‘isolation in the face of regional dangers’.144 
Theoretically, American protection was secured with the signing of the ANZUS treaty in 
1951 and the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in 1954, which also included 
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Australia’s long-time protector, Britain.145 However, Australians had learned that their 
unequivocal strategic dependence on these great powers often left them feeling more 
vulnerable than ever.
146
 Historian David McLean has noted that Australian policymakers’ 
tendency to inflate expectations of both the ANZUS alliance and Australian access to 
Washington’s decision-making processes repeatedly produced disappointment.147 This 
sentiment was felt after the failure of the United States to join with Australian forces both in 
preventing Indonesian acquisition of the Dutch territory of West New Guinea, and in 
combating Indonesia’s policy Konfrontasi against the new Malaysia Federation in the years 
1963 to 1966.
148
 Even the Kennedy-Barwick Memorandum signed by President Kennedy, US 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Australian Minister for External Affairs Sir Garfield 
Barwick in October 1963, which pledged American support if Indonesian aggression 
threatened Australian security, was littered with so many qualifications as to render the 
support virtually meaningless.
149
 Any American assistance would only be offered as a last 
resort and, more to the point, would be restricted to logistical aid.
150
 Continuing Australian 
concern over Indonesia’s regional ambitions was a significant factor in explaining Canberra’s 
willingness to support the United States in Vietnam.
151
 Furthermore, the government’s 
anxiety over America’s inconsistent regard for Australia’s interests in the Pacific was 
intensified by the anticipation of Britain’s abandonment of its defence commitments east of 
Suez. Signs of the British retreat from empire in the form of decolonisation and the 
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Macmillan government’s attempted entry into the EEC have been discussed in the previous 
chapter.  However it is worth re-emphasising that Britain’s inability to continue protecting 
Australia made it doubly urgent for the maintenance of an American interest and presence in 
Southeast Asia.
152
  In a period of strategic flux, Australians sought confirmation of a great 
power protector in the region in order to keep the threat from Asia distant.  
 
According to historians Peter Edwards and Gregory Pemberton, the aims of Australia and 
America in Vietnam were ‘parallel’ rather than ‘identical’.153 Both the United States and 
Australia were concerned with the containment of communism in Southeast Asia, and indeed 
the highpoint of Australian-American cooperation in this common endeavour was marked by 
Australia’s military commitment to Vietnam.154 However, the Menzies and Holt governments 
expressed more certainty than the Americans in the appropriateness of an unlimited American 
military commitment in Vietnam.
155
 It was American prestige and credibility, not its physical 
survival, that was threatened by the success of communism in Asia.
156
 On the other hand, the 
Liberal-Country party in Australia unanimously perceived the defeat of communism in Asia 
as a prerequisite to the continuation of the ‘Australian way of life’.157 There was, then, the 
belief that more was ‘at stake’ for Australia than America should the Vietnamese communists 
prevail.
158
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The Australian and New Zealand commitments to Vietnam aside, the troops of key American 
allies in the region, such as Thailand and the Philippines, were heavily subsidised by the 
Johnson administration.
159
 In a press conference in London en route to Washington in June 
1966, Holt had even criticised the Wilson government for withholding military assistance 
from Vietnam.
160
 To a considerable degree, Johnson appreciated this show of solidarity. His 
administration had been attacked for its Vietnam policy domestically and internationally, 
with Secretary General of the United Nations U Thant voicing his disagreement with 
America’s evaluation of the conflict, and Britain urging commencement of peace 
negotiations.
161
 To these, the Australian government remained opposed lest negotiations lead 
to American withdrawal and the stripping of the American cloak of protection from 
Australia’s back.162 But even after the application of pressure by Vice President Hubert 
Humphrey on his visit to Australia in February 1966, which led to an increase in Australian 
combat forces in March from 1 500 to 4 500, this number was not high enough for 
Johnson.
163
 Australia’s defence expenditure never rose above 4.6 per cent of its GNP 
compared to America’s at 9.7 per cent.164 This evidence suggests that contrary to the oft-
quoted slogan appropriated by Holt in Washington in July 1966, Australia was far from going 
‘all the way with LBJ’.165 Rather, the Holt government capped its human and material 
contribution to the conflict at such a level that it was rebuked by Democrat Senator William 
Fulbright for sending only a ‘token force’ whilst American troops were expected to ‘pay the 
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bill’.166 Such an approach is summarised by historian Peter King’s phrase that Australians 
would ‘fight in Southeast Asia to the last American’.167 During the visit to Australia, Johnson 
not only expressed gratitude for Australia’s willingness to stand by America in Vietnam in 
the defence of those unable to protect themselves from communist insurgence, but he also 
clarified ever so subtly that Australia could do more. 
 
The language of partnership: Rhetoric on the visit  
 
In framing the public face of alliance cooperation during this visit, Johnson returned to the 
wellspring of the Second World War. Adding a personal connection and endearing himself to 
the nation in which he was a guest, Johnson reminisced in his speeches on the circumstances 
which brought him to Townsville in 1942 – the threat from rampant Japanese militarism.168 
Identifying a tradition of partnership between America and Australia in the ‘struggle to 
preserve freedom’, Johnson located the manifestation of this partnership in the present when 
‘Australian sons’ were fighting ‘side by side’ with Americans in Vietnam.169 America came 
to Australia’s aid in World War Two, but aggression was defeated through mutual ‘sacrifice’, 
‘bravery’ and ‘determination’ on the part of the two nations and their allies.170 Whereas it was 
a ‘mission of war’ that motivated Johnson’s first visit to Australia as a soldier, his journey as 
president constituted a ‘mission of hope’.171 This mission not only comprised emphatic 
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confirmation of America’s belief that its decision to be in Vietnam was ‘right’ despite the 
heavy burden it placed on that nation, it also aimed to ‘warn’ Australia that its ‘work [was] 
not done’.172 That ‘Australians will go all the way as Americans will go all the way’, as the 
past had proved, was a truism taken for granted in Johnson’s speeches, but at the same time 
the president implored the nation to ensure it fulfilled this assumption.
173
  
 
 Drawing on the commonalities between America and its Pacific neighbour, Johnson showed 
that not only did the alliance possess ‘credibility’ insofar as America delivered on protection 
in the Second World War when its own interests were concerned, but it was also a natural 
alliance.
174
 The Australian landscape and wildlife brought to Johnson’s mind his own native 
Texas, but he was careful to emphasise that ‘the real similarities’ between America and 
Australia ‘were far deeper and more meaningful’ than topography or fauna.175 Rather, it was 
the parallel experiences and achievements of the Australian and American peoples – 
‘democratic politics’, ‘devotion to education’ and an ‘intelligent interest’ in foreign affairs – 
which Johnson pinpointed as the ‘foundations of friendship’ between the nations.176 Holt, too, 
spoke to this friendship in his welcome speech for Johnson at Canberra airport, reminding the 
public that America’s contribution ‘to the security of this nation’ at its hour of ‘greatest peril’ 
warranted Australia’s thanks.177 And although Holt’s expression of hope that between the 
American president and the Australian people will be established ‘a lingering bond of 
affection which will persist down through the years’ was not realised if presidential visits to 
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Australia after Johnson’s were any kind of measurement of this bond, Johnson himself spoke 
of his happiness in returning to a place of sentimental value that undoubtedly provided 
comfort to an increasingly stressed president.
178
   
 
Since the two nations shared common ‘goals’ and a common ‘future’ arising out of  similar 
political and cultural outlooks and growing ‘interdependence’, it followed for Johnson that 
the diplomatic, military and economic contributions made to the defence of the non-
communist Vietnamese should reflect Australia’s certainty in the necessity of the War.179 
Leadership and initiative would be required at the Manila Conference in late October from 
Holt and the New Zealand Prime Minister Keith Holyoake in impressing upon Vietnam’s Air 
Vice Marshal Nguyen Cao Ky the allies’ united front against Hanoi.180 Although in a private 
meeting with the Holt Cabinet in Canberra Johnson gave the impression that ‘he had not 
come to Australia to ask for a man or a dollar’, he made entirely clear that his conception of a 
workable, sustainable Australian-American alliance involved Australian commitment to 
Vietnam that demonstrated the importance of allied victory for Australia.
181
 This perspective 
was epitomised in Johnson’s public statement that the communist Asian enemy would reach 
Melbourne before San Francisco, and in the call for Australians to ‘decide how much your 
liberty and your freedom mean to you and what you are willing to pay for it’.182 The impact 
of Johnson’s rhetorical intensity caused journalist John Bennetts to comment that the 
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‘persuasive and confident’ Texan left Holt’s own oratorical style and prime ministerial 
presence in the president’s wake, and that Johnson had the ability to woo a crowd ‘like an 
evangelist’.183 But acknowledgment came from the British high commissioner in Australia, 
Charles Johnston, that the president’s speeches validated Holt’s conviction in the ‘wisdom’ of 
American strategy in Vietnam.
184
    
 
Opposing the War, supporting the alliance: Labor’s dilemma  
 
Johnson’s visit brought to the fore longstanding arguments within the Labor party about how 
best to articulate its view of the world and its relationship with America. Internal party 
conflict throughout the 1950s over the influence of communism in the party’s ranks, 
especially within the trade unions, culminated in the split of the party in 1955.
185
 After the 
split the coalition consistently argued that Labor was not fit to govern on the basis of its 
internal disharmony and incompetence in foreign policy and defence management.
186
 
Although many in the party looked to the United Nations for mediation in international 
affairs, discarding the American alliance was never a serious objective.
187
 Rather, as this 
section will show, the Labor party under Arthur Calwell proposed an alternative view of 
Australia’s role in the alliance. If Australia was to be a responsible ally, it should advise 
against foreign policy adventures which risked degrading America’s reputation and 
international standing. But articulating this approach at a time when the Australian public 
showed overwhelming support for America’s plight in Vietnam and the government’s posture 
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towards the War proved to be a challenging endeavour.
188
 Nevertheless, an examination of 
this tension within the Labor party and its explosion in the midst of the president’s tour 
provides a counterpoint to the traditional images of streamers, star-spangled banners and 
mellifluous rhetoric flowing through this period.  
 
Many in the Labor party did not view the government’s justifications for involvement in 
Vietnam as valid. Historian Henry Albinski’s argument that Labor politicians were less 
inclined to see the Vietnam conflict as an ‘externally-directed set-piece of communist 
aggression’ is reflected in Labor Senator John Wheeldon’s rejection of the ‘downward thrust 
by China’ theory on the basis of paucity of ‘evidence’.189 Neither was it true, the Labor party 
maintained, that Australia was committed to Vietnam under either ANZUS or SEATO. 
Historian Denis L. Cuddy has shown that despite External Affairs Minister Barwick’s and his 
successor Paul Hasluck’s offerings of legal justifications for participation in the War as an 
extension of ‘general obligations assumed under SEATO’, there was no reference made to 
SEATO by the South Vietnamese government in its acceptance of Australia’s offer of help.190 
Labor senators Wheeldon and Lionel Murphy strove to cast the Vietnam commitment as an 
arbitrary, irresponsible action of the government. If SEATO applied to Vietnam, Wheeldon 
argued, other European and Asian SEATO treaty members would be involved.
191
 Murphy 
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firmly denied any applicability ‘whatever’ of ANZUS to the Vietnam conflict.192 But both the 
Menzies and Holt governments claimed that obligations and responsibilities under Australia’s 
treaties warranted Australian troops in Vietnam. With a view to bolster the government’s 
decision in the public mind, Holt specified in his November election statement that Australia 
was fighting in Vietnam because of the duties that accompanied ANZUS and SEATO.
193
 In 
various statements made by Liberal-Country party politicians, though, the basic reason 
emerged for Australia’s desire to be in Vietnam, which was to show tangible support for the 
American alliance. Menzies stated that Australia ‘must not overlook the point that our 
alliances, as well as providing guarantees and assurances for our security, make demands 
upon us’, whilst Holt’s Defence Minister Allen Fairhall gave the vague explanation, meant as 
an affirmative clarification, that Australia was in Vietnam ‘by request, by treaty, by 
obligation and by commitment’.194  
 
According to historian Ashley Lavelle, Labor did not initially oppose American efforts in 
Vietnam.
195
 A February 1965 statement in the Sydney Morning Herald, for which 
responsibility is contentiously attributed to Labor politicians Jim Cairns and Allan D. Fraser, 
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gave approval of American intervention.
196
 The bombing of North Vietnam was acceptable 
insofar as it hastened commencement of a peace settlement.
197
 Cooperation between America 
and Australia was endorsed in the statement as it was necessary for the establishment of 
suitable social and economic conditions conducive to free elections in Southeast Asia.
198
 The 
statement also gave voice to the fear of the communist menace creeping ever closer to 
Australia’s shores.199 That communism posed a danger to Australia’s capitalist democracy 
was accepted wisdom in both the Liberal-Country party and elements of the Labor party.
200
 
As historian Neville Meaney has argued, Labor in this period was never anti-American but 
instead gave voice to an idea of America different to that espoused by the conservatives; that 
is, ‘the America of social progress, liberal reform, civil rights and equal opportunity’ 
envisaged in the principles of leaders such as Franklin Delano Roosevelt.
201
  
 
It was over national service, or the less palatable term conscription, that Labor began its own 
war on the coalition government in earnest.
202
 Menzies’ announcement in April 1965 of the 
possibility that Australian conscripts would be sent overseas was followed by the notice 
given by Prime Minister Holt in March 1966 that conscripts would be among the additional 
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numbers sent to Vietnam.
203
 Conscription was judged by the government to be ‘the most 
militarily effective way’ to show support for America’s containment strategy in Vietnam, 
particularly given the failure of voluntary enlistment.
204
 A different vision of alliance 
management was offered in Calwell’s 4 May 1965 response to Menzies’ troop commitment 
announcement.
205
 Sensitive to America’s status as a global superpower, Calwell argued that 
American interests were jeopardised by the involvement of Australian conscripts. Asserting 
that America ‘must not be humiliated in Asia’, and that America should initiate negotiations 
whilst it still had the upper hand, Calwell insisted that sending conscripts to Vietnam would 
only prolong what was an ‘unwinnable’ ‘civil war’, at the end of which the communists 
would prove victorious.
206
 The Labor party’s objection to conscription was also based on the 
belief that it reflected the government’s misinterpretation of the lesson of Munich: to ‘move 
early and decisively against rising threats’.207 This misinterpretation meant that the 
government placed too much emphasis on military methods of meeting a political threat 
which would only be defeated through economic aid and diplomatic strategies.
208
 Sending 
conscripts would therefore assist the allies’ defeat in the long term and facilitate the demise 
of American power and prestige. Labor’s objection also comprised a strong moral element, 
summarised by Calwell in parliament on 10 May 1966:  
The government’s attitude represents… a cowardly desertion of responsibility by 
throwing the almost whole, ultimate burden of military service in this country on to a 
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section of our twenty year old youths who have neither a voice nor a choice in their 
consignment, maybe, to an early death in jungle swamps.
209
  
 
For these strategic and ethical reasons, conscription was not seen by the Labor party either as 
a way to nurture the American alliance or to accomplish a favourable outcome in Vietnam.  
  
Opposition to conscription was a key plank of the Labor party platform in the November 
1966 election, which was essentially a referendum on conscription, but the party lacked a 
united voice on when and which troops would be withdrawn should the Australian people 
elect a Labor government.
210
 The Federal Parliamentary Caucus policy statement of 12 May 
1965 asserted that a future Labor government would return conscripts home immediately and 
would return the regular army troops home ‘as soon as practicable’.211 The policy of 
withdrawing conscripts but not volunteers was in itself impractical, but more importantly the 
party came under fire for at once diluting and strengthening its May 1965 promise.
212
 
Incompatible statements on troop withdrawal were made by Gough Whitlam and Calwell.
213
 
Careful to avoid appearing too extreme, Whitlam had offered national servicemen a choice to 
stay in Vietnam or return home.
214
 Offering a different line again, Calwell on 23 August 1966 
insisted all troops would be returned to Australia as early as possible.
215
 The party was 
attacked for not having made decisive conclusions on its ‘real [troop withdrawal] policy’.216 
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Not only had Labor’s conscription stance oscillated between factions, it had also changed 
over time. Levelling the charge of hypocrisy against the Labor party, Liberal Senator Francis 
McManus noted that members of the party were pro-conscription in the World Wars: ‘I am 
opposed to a party which was the first party in Australian history to introduce compulsory 
military training… going before the people and describing itself as an anti-conscription 
party’.217 The inability of Labor to show solidarity over the conscription issue and the 
government’s condemnation of the party’s inconsistency reflected the broader problem of 
incoherent party policy arising out of internecine debate.  
 
Divisions in the Labor party had been apparent since early 1965.
218
 Calwell himself was 
increasingly being perceived as ‘awkward, aged and out of touch’ with the electorate.219 
Additionally the party was seen by many as a ‘captive of the extreme left’.220 Cairns, 
apparently criticised by the left for his endorsement of American intervention in Vietnam, 
was then labelled a ‘traitor’ by the leftists for his speech to Labor party candidates before the 
November election in which he did not foreground the troop withdrawal issue.
221
 Also 
voicing the concern over left-wing extremism, Liberal Senator Magnus Cormack ridiculed 
the lack of consensus in the Labor party due to the simultaneous worship of ‘several 
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communist prophets’ by its members.222 In assessing the nature of the division in the Labor 
party in 1966, Lavelle has shown that the party was not merely ‘polarised’ around the 
perspectives of Calwell and Whitlam.
223
 Rather, several other Labor politicians like Kim 
Beazley Snr and Sam Benson vocalised their own disagreement with Calwell’s ideas.224 Such 
dissent played straight into the coalition’s hands, with Liberal Senator Edward Mattner 
declaring that ‘waves of divergent opinions are rocking the Australian Labor Party ship’.225 
Labor Senator Samuel Cohen’s denouncement of the government’s Manichean ‘goodies and 
badies’ approach to the Vietnam War and his assertion that the better albeit vacuous 
alternative was to show that ‘Australia has a voice of its own in these matters’ could not have 
been expected to eventuate within a party unable to decide which voice to heed.
226
 There 
were those in parliament who expressed discontent with the government’s dependence on the 
American alliance for foreign policy direction, but Australians would not take seriously a 
party that could not organise its own affairs.
227
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A party that could not formulate a unifying foreign policy agenda based on the unequivocal 
view that communism everywhere was a potential threat to Australia was easily made to 
appear suspect on its management of Australia’s ANZUS treaty. In March 1966 the Liberal-
Country party launched an assault on Labor’s re-wording of its official defence platform the 
previous year. In the Foreign Affairs section of the document, a line had been inserted 
explicating the need for Australia to ‘periodically review its defence treaties and alliances to 
meet new circumstances as they arise’.228 Exploiting this as an example of Labor’s 
untrustworthiness, Holt warned that if the public voted for Labor in the upcoming election, 
there would be no hope that ‘the treaties and alliances to which Australia is part would be 
honoured’.229  Despite Whitlam’s retort that a section had been added to the platform stating 
that the Labor party ‘believes Australia cannot isolate itself from the struggles of the peoples 
of the world’, demonstrating Labor’s belief in the necessity of ‘universal or regional treaty 
arrangements’, the coalition continued to taunt the Opposition with charges of weakness in 
defence maintenance.
230
 One example is Liberal politician William Aston’s declaration that 
Labor had only a ‘lukewarm attitude’ to SEATO and ANZUS.231 In a more strident tone, 
Liberal Senator Cormack claimed that the Labor party saw no value in treaties and would, if 
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given the powers of government, endanger Australia’s security.232 In contrast the government 
aimed to convince the public that its handling of the American alliance was advantageous to 
the nation at the time and in the future, stressing the importance of mutual input in order to 
derive mutual benefit: ‘Australia needs friends. We need powerful friends and we need 
reliable friends. The only circumstances in which we are entitled to have a friend [are] if we 
are a good friend ourselves. If we want a steadfast friend, we must be a steadfast friend’.233 
By conveying its own supremacy in alliance management, particularly that with America, the 
Holt government was able to perpetuate the image fashioned by Menzies of the conservative 
party holding a ‘monopoly of wisdom in the foreign policy field’.234 Such an image of Holt’s 
grasp of Asian issues and their importance for Australia was reinforced by his tour of the 
Southeast Asian region only four months into his prime ministership.
235
   
 
Labor ran into difficulty in communicating its opposition to conscription and Australia’s 
involvement in the Vietnam War but not the American alliance or official treaties, a dilemma 
that also risked offending the president himself.
236
 Withholding party support for the anti-
Vietnam protests encouraged by Federal Labor Party President Jim Keeffe during Johnson’s 
tour, Labor wanted to avoid seeming not only anti-American but ‘discourteous’ to a visiting 
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dignitary.
237
 But at times Labor either could not or did not avoid these labels. Suggesting the 
government was failing to protect Australian citizens out of concern for the American 
alliance, and that America would not reciprocate support for Australia if America’s interests 
were not involved, Labor Senator Wheeldon implied American unreliability.
238
 Another 
accusation interpreted as having given offence to America and Johnson particularly was made 
by Labor politician Tom Uren. Quick to soften his remark that Johnson was easily influenced 
by the ‘hawks’ in his government, Uren denied any intention to ‘bash and abuse’ the 
president.
239
 That his comment carried a grain of truth was less important than the impression 
it gave of Uren’s disapproval of Johnson’s foreign policy decisions.240 At the end of 
Johnson’s meeting with Labor party leaders at the Canberra Rex, in which Johnson 
emphasised that ‘either a treaty relationship had validity or it did not’, Chairman of the 
Australian Labor Party Foreign Affairs Committee, Fraser, abandoned all politeness and let 
fly the comment ‘Thanks for the lecture, Mr President’.241 It was Calwell, ironically part 
American, who crossed the line entirely at the parliamentary luncheon for Johnson.
242
 There 
the Labor leader pointed out the president’s own Democratic colleagues, including senators 
William Fulbright, Wayne Morse and Robert Kennedy, who ‘were not prepared to go all the 
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way with LBJ’.243 According to journalist Alan Reid, Calwell had committed the sin of 
involving himself in the domestic politics of his guest.
244
 Furthermore Calwell’s jibe 
solidified in the public’s eyes that the Australian-American alliance was best managed by 
Holt’s government and Johnson. This was reflected in the fact that Labor, particularly its 
leader, had used the ‘all the way’ rhetoric to challenge rather than fertilise the alliance and 
could not emulate the cosy personal relationship between Holt and Johnson.
245
 Indeed the 
president was well-versed on Calwell’s foreign policy views before his touch-down in the 
country and was advised to deal with Calwell the same way ‘he would with individuals who 
disagree with or have reservations about [American] policy’.246   
 
Added to the awkwardness of Labor’s position was the impact on domestic politics of the 
Johnson visit. It has been argued by academics Alan Bloomfield and Kim Nossal that the 
timing of Johnson’s visit, which came only a month prior to the federal election, gave rise to 
anti-American sentiment in the Labor party.
247
 Labor parliamentarian Fred Daly, for example, 
reproached Holt for organising Johnson’s tour through cities in which the government’s 
‘electoral stocks’ were at a ‘record low level’ before the visit.248 The charge by Labor party 
politicians that the organisation of the visit was an exercise in ‘electioneering’ and that 
Johnson was meddling in Australian domestic politics was not articulated outside of 
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parliament.
249
 To the media, Calwell reported his expectation that Johnson’s tour would not 
influence Australians at the polls, presumably in an attempt to isolate the visit from the 
sphere of domestic electoral politics.
250
 Although the electoral advantage potentially derived 
from a visit by the American president would not have escaped Holt’s attention, and the visit 
certainly did the coalition no harm, other factors were salient in accounting for the record 
majority with which the coalition was returned to government.
251
 For example, historian 
Trevor Reese has noted that electorates in the 1960s were still attracted to easily digestible 
over-simplifications such as ‘aggressive communism’ or ‘loyalty to an ally’, whilst academic 
Paul D. Williams has determined that the strength of anti-communist feeling in the 
community and popular support for Holt’s posture towards Vietnam were crucial.252 Holt’s 
quip that his party did not need a visit from the American president to defeat the Opposition 
in the election has been proved accurate.
253
 At the time, though, Labor party members’ strong 
expressions of the feeling that it was not fair game for the president to address the Australian 
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public on the issue over which the election was fought bordered on vilification of their 
guest.
254
  
 
In sum, the different approaches taken by the government and the Labor party towards the 
Vietnam War which were highlighted in the months before and the days of Johnson’s tour 
allowed the government to present Labor as a party that could not be trusted either to take a 
hard line on communism, to honour the treaties Australia had signed, or to preserve the 
American alliance. Here was a series of lethal rhetorical grenades that the government lobbed 
directly into Labor’s lap. Gaining most Australians’ appreciation, the government was 
delivering on these precious concerns of which the most tangible evidence was the presence 
of the United States president on Australian soil. Crucially, however, not even at the peak of 
Australia’s commitment to Vietnam could the Australian government be accused of forgoing 
its nation’s security interests out of deference to its powerful ally. By keeping its troop 
commitment and defence expenditure minimal, the Holt government was able to honour and 
maintain the alliance without significant military or economic sacrifice.    
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Chapter Three: People  
 
Having established that not all Australian political leaders approved of President Lyndon 
Johnson’s conduct of the Vietnam War and the Holt government’s absolute support for this 
approach, this chapter examines the response of the Australian people to Johnson and his 
wife Lady Bird Johnson during their October visit. Three dimensions of this reaction will be 
explored. The first is the frenzied build-up to and euphoric celebrations during the event. 
Since opposition to America’s waging of war in Vietnam occurred not only inside parliament, 
but also outside of it on city streets, the following section will consider the organised 
demonstrations and occasional violent outbursts during the president’s tour. This unrest 
reflected an anti-war movement still lacking focus but undergoing slow, steady growth.
255
 
Finally it will be shown that Australians had mixed responses to Johnson and Lady Bird as 
individuals. Whilst overwhelmingly positive media coverage improved Australians’ views of 
the Johnsons as leaders and human beings, the actions of Johnson and some of his staff 
emphasised the gulf between Australians’ and Americans’ understandings of appropriate 
guest behaviour. University lecturer Alison Broinowski has insisted that Australian 
complicity in the American alliance has made Australian culture an imitation of its senior 
ally, whilst another academic, Erik Paul, has argued that the Vietnam War was a ‘watershed’ 
period accelerating this process.
256
 The evidence presented here repudiates this argument for 
a culturally subservient Australia.   
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Johnson’s visit was covered extensively by all modes of Australian popular media, including 
the press, television and radio. Following its introduction to Australia in 1956, television’s 
ability to shape public opinion through current affairs programs grew steadily throughout the 
1960s.
257
 However, as academics John S. Western and Colin A. Hughes have found, the press 
in 1966 was still viewed as the primary disseminator of news in Australia.
258
 For this reason, 
as well as the paucity of motion picture and radio sources available, an examination of how 
the media reported the preparations for Johnson’s visit and the event itself necessarily relies 
on newspapers and magazines. In order to obtain an accurate picture of the slightly varied 
slants taken on the tour by particular media corporations, this study considers not only 
broadsheet newspapers like the Sydney Morning Herald but also tabloid newspapers. In the 
most favourable view, tabloids have been associated with ‘the everyday concerns of non-elite 
readers’ such as women and young people.259 More commonly, and particularly since the 
early twentieth century, tabloids have been criticised for their dramatisation of news and 
unsophisticated news analysis.
260
 Nevertheless, neglecting the tabloids is to ignore an entire 
section of Australian readers. The inclusion of women’s magazines also contributes to a more 
representative media sample for study. Features on the Johnsons in the Australian Women’s 
Weekly and Woman’s Day are examined for what Australian women wrote and read about the 
visiting political celebrities.  
 
The political inclinations of the various organs of the press were at times apparent in the 
reporting of the president’s swing through Australia. The Murdoch-owned corporation News 
Limited, which issued the Sydney tabloid the Daily Mirror and the national newspaper the 
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Australian, took an anti-Vietnam stance.
261
 This led to a 25 per cent circulation drop for the 
Australian after the 1966 election.
262
 As well as these Murdoch-owned newspapers, 
Melbourne’s Age was noted for its bias towards the Labor party in a 1973 Australian 
Broadcasting Commission report.
263
 This same survey found that the Sydney Morning 
Herald, owned by John Fairfax, was most biased towards the coalition of all the newspapers 
under consideration here.
264
 However, it is notable that Western and Hughes’ research 
determined that only a small percentage of Australian newspaper consumers in the late 1960s 
read one newspaper daily, with most reading newspapers from more than one of the main 
news ownership groups – Herald and Weekly Times, Fairfax and News Limited – per day.265 
In sum, most Australians interested in current affairs gained their news from newspapers, and 
in reading across media ownership groups Australians were exposed to a relatively balanced 
view of Johnson’s tour.   
 
Near delirium: The Australian reaction to LBJ   
 
Following confirmation of an upcoming American presidential trip to Australia’s east coast in 
early October, Australian authorities articulated a keen sensitivity to the world-wide attention 
Australia would receive throughout the event.
266
 The extent of this attention was noted by 
New South Wales Premier Bob Askin, when he informed a group of retail merchants at a 
Retail Traders’ Association meeting that an expected 200 million people throughout the 
world would see Sydney’s welcome to the president on television.267 That ‘Australians with 
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power’ genuinely value the way others perceive the nation has been discussed by historian 
Richard White.
268
 Given that Johnson’s visit coincided with an uncomfortable but critical 
period of introspection on the substance of an authentic Australian nationalism, a concept 
developed in Chapter One, White’s observation of the outsider’s influence on Australians’ 
conceptions of themselves is particularly relevant for this study. Approval from the 
international community of Australia’s welcome and treatment of their distinguished guests 
would affirm the nation’s competence, creativity and maturity.  
 
The prospect of such an occasion thrusting Australia into the international spotlight sparked 
an urgent and intense two-week preparation process, particularly in Canberra and Sydney, 
reflecting the authorities’ nervousness that their logistical management of the tour would 
invite judgments about Australians as hosts. The hotel that the Johnsons called home for most 
of their visit, the Canberra Rex, underwent a thorough makeover before the Johnsons arrived, 
as did the city of Canberra itself.
269
 For the barbeque at Lanyon Station held by the American 
Embassy on the Saturday of the visit, extensive catering was organised by the staff of the 
Canberra Rex and new amenities specially built.
270
 The demands placed upon the hotel by the 
visit’s coordinators caused one journalist to ask whether ‘other heads of state will expect the 
same kind of treatment if they stay at the Rex’, implying that the Johnsons were beneficiaries 
of unquestionably special efforts by their hosts.
271
 A visit by the American president and his 
wife instilled the usually ‘blasé’ Australian capital, to use a Sydney Morning Herald 
journalist’s term, with the drive to impress.272  
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The welcome arrangements for the president’s half-day stopover in Sydney were particularly 
elaborate. ‘Make Sydney Gay for LBJ’ was the theme announced by Premier Askin around 
which Sydney’s greeting was organised, and this theme applied not only to civic space but to 
individuals’ homes.273 Welcome signs, coloured beach towels and other brightly dyed 
materials were suggested as window decorations.
274
 Sydney Harbour, too, took part in the 
visual spectacle. Owners of boats that were anchored in the Harbour whilst the president’s 
own vessel was scheduled to cruise by were encouraged to ‘fly flags and decorate their craft 
appropriately’.275 Predictably overburdened trains and buses had the additional task of 
transporting New South Wales children under the age of fifteen to the city for free which, 
although costly, was for Mr Askin a worthwhile concession to create a ‘memorable’ 
experience.
276
 Sydney authorities engineered the city’s public reception of the Johnsons in 
order to promote a festive atmosphere and maximise crowd turnout, anxious to show that 
Sydney honoured the representatives of Australia’s principal ally.277     
 
Although both Canberra and Sydney deliberately planned their welcomes to the Johnsons, it 
was between Sydney and Melbourne that rivalry emerged over the most appropriate way to 
express enthusiasm for their American guests. Whereas Premier Askin announced that 
Sydney would give Johnson ‘an Australian welcome, but along American lines’, implying 
that Sydney’s Citizens’ Welcoming Committee aimed for a standout celebration of epic 
proportions, Victorian Premier Sir Henry Bolte remarked that ‘“Sydney can do what it likes. 
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Melbourne’s welcome will be normal, spontaneous and unrehearsed”’.278 But Melbourne’s 
insurance was secured in an organised welcome put on stand-by, consisting of all the tinsel 
and trappings that the Sydney Committee had planned.
279
 The fretfulness of the state leaders 
over their cities’ preparations conflicted with the concerns of some elements of the Australian 
population who voiced their criticisms of Sydney’s ceremonial provisions in the Daily 
Mirror.
280
 One eighteen-year-old male believed ‘too much ballyhoo’ had been made of the 
visit in general and that Sydney’s preparations should have been ‘more dignified’.281 Two 
days later the same newspaper printed another claim that ‘Sydney folk hadn’t really planned 
[the welcome] at all’, suggesting a gap between the authorities’ and citizen body’s ideas 
about how the nation should receive the American president.
282
 Perhaps the most censorious 
opinion was given in the Sun: ‘There is a point at which welcome can become embarrassing 
for guest and hosts alike… Let us not go before the world as hero-worshipping juveniles’.283 
It would seem many Australians perceived the welcome celebrations for Johnson as tests of 
the national character. But whilst most saw in the visit an opportunity to showcase 
unmatchable loyalty to their powerful ally, others saw the danger of being perceived as a 
fawning nation of sycophants, whilst still others simply favoured a ‘voluntary’ ‘Australian 
welcome’.284  
 
Johnson’s rapturous reception in New Zealand was repeated in Australia.285 Whether the 
welcome was planned or not, wild ‘Johnsonmania’ swept through the streets of Canberra, 
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Melbourne, Sydney, Brisbane and Townsville.
286
 Reams of newspaper reports relayed scenes 
of Australians unable to contain their jubilation during this three-day period. The ‘spectacular 
scenes of tickertape, flag-waving and surging masses of people’ urged the editor of the 
Courier Mail to conclude that Melbourne residents’ ‘unbridled enthusiasm’ was of a sort 
unprecedented in Australia.
287
 This comment suggested that the ‘frenzy’ of the Queen’s 1954 
Royal tour had been momentarily downgraded in the public memory, such was the tribute 
paid to Johnson.
288
 In every Australian city the president strove for union with civilians, 
hand-shaking, finger-touching, howdy-ing and grinning.
289
 According to the Daily Mirror, 
the combination of warm weather and the nervous thrill of being close to Johnson proved too 
much for some women who required treatment from St John’s ambulances outside the 
Sydney Art Gallery.
290
 It is therefore no understatement to conclude, even when considering 
the hyperbolic nature of the media coverage, that Johnson’s presence drove some Australians 
into a state of near delirium.  
 
‘Pummelled’ repeatedly in each city by people desperately trying to reach the president, 
Johnson’s security guards were apparently in need of liniment to soothe the aches and bruises 
acquired over the ‘most strenuous three days of their careers’.291 But the security guards’ 
stresses were not only attributable to friendly clamouring crowds: protesters carrying 
placards, shouting hostility and in some cases physically lashing out at the authorities also 
took their toll on those accountable for the protection of the president.  
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Not all were ‘all the way’: Protests and demonstrations   
 
The years of the Vietnam War called into question many of the established social and 
political assumptions for Americans and Australians, particularly the younger generations.
292
 
Unlike television media coverage in America, few Australian television segments or 
programs were critical of the Vietnam War, but those that took this stance, such as ABC’s 
Four Corners, challenged the government’s framing of the Vietnam conflict.293 For 
Australians who admonished their government for its ‘lack of a distinctive Australian stand’ 
in foreign affairs, which was seen to have mired Australia in Vietnam, social protest became 
one way to confront politicians with the purportedly authentic feeling of the nation.
294
 To the 
disappointment of Australian radicals, many of the methods used to oppose American 
political supremacy originated in America itself, although this did not detract from the 
importance of protest in the Australian context.
295
 Thus Australian anti-war demonstrators, 
‘seemingly mesmerised by foreign models of rebellion’, participated in demonstrative 
marches, vigils, strikes, concerts and teach-ins.
296
 Anti-war protests in Australia were initially 
monopolised by the Communist party, despite its members’ hopes for wider support.297 
Change within the protest movement occurred following the early 1965 commencement of 
America’s bombing of North Vietnam and Robert Menzies’ subsequent troop increase 
announcement, when Australian anti-conscription groups such as Youth Campaign Against 
Conscription and Save Our Sons began their own vociferous campaigns against government 
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policy.
298
 Historian Jeffrey Grey has argued that the formation of these groups was 
symptomatic of the gradual shift of the anti-war movement away from the periphery and into 
the mainstream.
299
 Certainly public disapproval of conscription was gaining more exposure 
around the time of the president’s Australian travels, for example in the highly publicised 
case of school teacher and pacifist William White. His refusal to obey his 18 July 1966 call-
up notice on the grounds of conscientious objection led to a gaol sentence after the election 
later that year.
300
 Whilst White’s obstinacy regardless of the personal cost attracted excessive 
media attention, headlines were also made by disruption in the streets.
301
 In an atmosphere 
where Australians, like Americans, were experimenting with ‘theatricality’ to challenge the 
status quo, authorities recognised that Johnson’s hyped-up arrival would provide the perfect 
stage for organised and spontaneous expression of anti-Vietnam dissent.
302
 Accordingly 
warnings were issued for the public to behave in the presence of a visiting dignitary. 
Queensland Police Commissioner Francis Bischof made an appeal to the public to cooperate 
during the welcome festivities.
303
 And with the Courier Mail editor’s acknowledgment that 
Johnson was a ‘tall and tempting target for the discontented’, potential protesters were 
advised to ‘cool it’ given that Johnson was first and foremost Australia’s ‘honoured guest’.304 
Although the majority complied with this directive, it is important to consider the number 
who did not for the insight they provide into the Australian image of America at this time.  
 
Labor leader Arthur Calwell anticipated that the demonstrations would cut across political 
party lines, for example with the involvement not only of Labor party sympathisers but of 
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parents from the Liberal and Country parties whose ‘“sons [had] been dragged off to 
war”’.305 Indeed in Sydney, women carrying ‘Save Our Sons’ banners slipped past the 
barricades near Hyde Park and sat in front of one of the presidential motorcycles.
306
 But 
contrary to an image of the masses having gained purchase on the act of demonstrating as a 
vehicle for expression, historian Henry Albinski has shown that educated and professional 
people made up the bulk of the Australian anti-war movement.
307
 History lecturer at the 
University of Sydney, Dr Kenneth Macnab, was actively involved in the protest movement, 
contributing his signature to a list of names published in the Australian as an anti-Vietnam 
War advertisement. Other signatories on the list included academics, clergymen, teachers, 
journalists, medical professionals, architects and artists.
308
 Students and young people were 
also key constituents of the protests and their brazenness often made news.
309
 Preferring to let 
his actions speak for him, twenty-one-year-old John Morgan was sentenced to four months in 
prison and dealt a ten dollar fine for throwing an egg at a bus carrying pressmen in Johnson’s 
entourage.
310
 Youths were subject to police discipline in Melbourne, where the Langley 
brothers aged eighteen and twenty-one were arrested after pelting the presidential limousine 
with bags of red and green paint, splattering Johnson’s security guards as well as unlucky 
bystanders.
311
 In a written statement of apology to the president, the boys’ lawyer specified 
that ‘their action was not inspired by any malevolent feeling towards you or the great nation 
you represent’.312 Of most importance was the desire to prove that the decision to hurl paint 
at Johnson’s motorcade was motivated by opposition to the Vietnam War and was not 
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intended as a personal attack on Johnson.
313
 When Federal Labor Party President Jim Keeffe 
essentially encouraged demonstrations during Johnson’s visit, Calwell qualified that Keeffe 
did not request protests against Johnson himself.
314
 Similarly the demonstration of church 
ministers led by Reverend Alan Walker in Sydney intended to ‘express opposition to the 
president’s policies without being discourteous’.315 Facing the same dilemma as the Labor 
party, protesting the Vietnam War without criticising Johnson or offending the American 
nation was voiced as a primary concern for many demonstrators.  
 
But not all demonstrators confined their protests to American policy. The Canberra Times 
reported that demonstrations throughout the visit manifested both anti-Vietnam and anti-
Johnson content.
316
 There were a number of Australian demonstrators who opposed Johnson 
as the leader of the nation conducting a reprehensible military offensive in Vietnam. These 
demonstrators brandished placards that read ‘Go Away, LBJ’ and ‘Try LBJ for War Crimes’, 
and chanted ‘Hey, hey, LBJ, how many kids did you kill today?’317 Moreover, the Sun 
Herald conflated protest against the president with protest against his policies by reporting 
that anti- and pro-Johnson mobs clashed at the Art Gallery in Sydney.
318
 One tabloid 
interpreted the sentiment of the Sydney demonstrations to encompass broad anti-
Americanism. Thus the Daily Mirror claimed that the disruptions by students were both ‘anti-
Vietnam’ and ‘anti-US’ which was confirmed by an attempt to snap the flagpole from which 
the American flag flew.
319
 In an attempt to clarify Australia’s goodwill towards America 
despite the contrariness of the demonstrations, American Ambassador to Australia Ed Clark 
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told an American journalist that the demonstrations were ‘against [the United States] 
government rather than against the president personally’.320 Nevertheless, concern arose that 
the anti-Johnson, anti-American demonstrations had spoiled international opinion of 
Australians.
321
 An article in the Age stated that during Johnson’s visit, ‘national good 
manners were to some extent on trial, and it would be useless to pretend that [Australia’s] 
reputation for tolerance and courtesy suffered no damage from some of the violent scenes 
which broke out between the protesters and the police’.322 Although some American 
newspapers such as the New York Post and New York World Journal Tribune conveyed the 
protests as ‘the worst abuse’ of the president’s career, Johnson was no stranger to public 
demonstrations.
323
 The president himself stated that American demonstrations against the 
War had been conducted ‘with equal vigour’.324  
 
The intensity of the demonstrations and the public backlash towards them revealed the deep 
divisions in Australian society not only over conscription but over how to express opposition 
to a visiting dignitary, especially the head of state of the nation’s most powerful ally. The 
majority of the demonstrations during Johnson’s visit were heated, although security on both 
the American and Australian sides was arranged accordingly.
325
 Breaking through the 
barricades after learning of Johnson’s backdoor entry to the Canberra Rex on his first night in 
the country, Vietnam Action Committee protesters were only kept away from the hotel entry 
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by a wall of policemen.
326
 Where emotions ran high, the demonstrations occasionally spilled 
over into physical skirmishes. Although these were reported, the British high commissioner 
commented that the ‘ugliness’ of the Sydney demonstrations, which caused the president’s 
limousine to speed past disappointed onlookers, was underplayed by the press.
327
 Dramas in 
Melbourne were given adequate attention, however, with the Age reporting that police on 
horseback charged through swarms of anti-Vietnam demonstrators which were uncontrollable 
even by numerous detectives and extra policemen armed with batons.
328
 Of course, such 
responses to the American president made eye-catching headlines which the tabloid 
newspapers repeatedly exploited. In the Daily Mirror, the Sun Herald and the Sun, the 
violence that punctuated some of the protests was presented in titles such as ‘Wild Brawls in 
LBJ Welcome’, ‘Police Charge 13: Wild Scenes’ and ‘Brawls, Riot and a Bomb Scare!’.329 It 
should be noted that the higher quantity of photographs showing police-civilian confrontation 
in the Daily Mirror compared to the broadsheets spoke not only to that tabloid’s anti-Vietnam 
stance but also to sales-generating tabloid shock tactics.
330
 Not surprisingly, some Australians 
responded to protest violence during the president’s tour with objections of their own. 
Defying Labor parliamentarian Jim Cairn’s demand that anti-Vietnam protests must ‘at all 
times and in all places be dignified and responsible’, many protesters ‘exceeded the bounds in 
expressing their dissent’ and consequently they did ‘the greatest disservice to the 
conscientious citizens who agree with their views but disapprove of their means of exhibiting 
them’.331 It was the manner in which the demonstrations took place rather than the act of 
demonstrating itself that was abrasive for Australians who defended public protest as ‘a very 
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old and very valuable part of democracy’.332 However as Grey has noted, for most 
Australians political agitation on the streets whether peaceful or not was an unattractive 
feature of the Vietnam era.
333
 Given this opinion of ‘ordinary’ Australians it was little wonder 
that the fierce outbursts during Johnson’s visit only worked against the Labor party’s 
electoral campaign.
334
 
 
Protests and demonstrations against the Vietnam War and in some cases the American 
president were widespread and well-planned but conducted by a minority.
335
 With the 
exception of the aforementioned tabloids, the media framed the demonstrations and protests 
as blips in the proceedings or ‘aberrant’ incidents that marred the otherwise ecstatic 
celebrations.
336
 Demonstrators marched in every city except Townsville, with numbers 
reportedly peaking at two thousand in Sydney, but were always drowned out by thunderous 
applause and ear-splitting cheering for both the president and his nation.
337
 The ultimate 
evaluation made by the New York Times was that Johnson’s Australian tour was a ‘“marked 
success”’.338 Nevertheless, the total number of Australians who dissented during Johnson’s 
time in Australia was not insignificant and was a prelude to the larger demonstrations later in 
the War.
339
 Regardless of the size of the demonstrations it was America’s decision to 
extricate itself from the War in 1969 that provided the impetus for the Australian 
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government’s own withdrawal of troops.340 In terms of its political decision-making and 
foreign policy conduct, America was viewed by many Australians as neither a responsible 
superpower nor a model nation. For these reasons, the argument that Australia in the mid-
1960s was hankering to become America’s fifty-first state must be subjected to greater 
scrutiny.
341
   
 
Media coverage of the president’s three-day tour was not solely concentrated on maniacal 
crowd behaviour. Deeper reflections on Australians’ responses to their American guests by 
media commentators and the political elite at the time of the visit reveal multi-layered 
perceptions of the visitors who, for the most part, charmed and entertained but in some 
circumstances grated against Australians’ conceptions of propriety. Additionally, the media 
provided a complete background of the figures who had caused a level of commotion in the 
Australian community previously generated only by the Queen’s visits. Throughout the 
Johnsons’ stay, the nation was briefed on Mr and Mrs Johnson’s respective roles as president 
and first lady, which can be seen as an exercise in familiarising Australians with the 
seemingly elevated lifestyles of their guests. These comments plus media evaluations of the 
Johnsons’ actions during the visit reshaped the personal images of the Johnsons in the 
Australian public mind.  
 
‘Strange and exciting’: Reactions to LBJ and Lady Bird  
 
Australians were intrigued by the glamour of American politics brought to them from across 
the Pacific during Johnson’s visit. Johnson’s Pacific tour was ‘deliberately aimed at the 
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people’.342 The president’s employment of ‘United States electioneering techniques’ on the 
crowds gathered at Canberra airport and in the subsequent cities was somewhat ‘surprising’ 
for Australians, according to an Age journalist.
343
 Australians soon learned that hand-shaking, 
back-slapping and the occasional child-kissing were Johnson’s way of connecting with the 
public.
344
 Lady Bird, too, was not content to remain aloof, preferring instead to mix with the 
crowds in Melbourne and Sydney.
345
 Not only did this person-to-person diplomacy place the 
crowds firmly in the president’s corner, but Johnson himself seemed to derive ‘genuine 
pleasure’ from the interactions.346 He gained approval from the Australian public at a time 
when he was politically beleaguered at home, and his appreciation was made evident 
whenever he blared flattery and thanks through the loudspeaker in his limousine.
347
 But 
Australians were more than happy to oblige the political superstar. The chemistry between 
the president and the crowds was aptly described by one media commentator as ‘a sort of 
mutual intoxication’.348 For the British high commissioner in Australia, the crowds were 
enthralled not only by the ‘campaigning folksiness’ that underpinned Johnson’s conduct but 
also by the novelty of the visit.
349
 The security arrangements, undoubtedly intensified in light 
of President Kennedy’s assassination three years earlier, were ‘the tightest… ever seen’ in 
their country.
350
 Newspapers gave attention to the preparatory trips to Australia made by 
Federal Bureau of Investigation and Central Intelligence Agency officers, as well as to the 
security guard who threw himself across Johnson’s body when Kennedy was shot.351 The 
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cumulative effect of Johnson’s crowd encounters and elaborate planning for the president’s 
safety was that Australians found the whole event ‘strange and exciting’.352  
 
However some Australians became agitated and even offended by the actions of Johnson and 
his team. Although the president, the crowds and the photographers loved Johnson’s constant 
stopping of his limousine in order to step out and greet the buzzing masses, this often upset 
‘the security men and the patient organisers who had had their timetable thrown out’.353 In 
fact the president seemed to have little regard for protocol, keeping the governor general and 
his wife waiting at Government House for forty-five minutes on Johnson’s first evening in 
the country.
354
 As the British high commissioner commented, ‘the Americans made it 
absolutely clear who was the boss’.355 This was particularly true of those responsible for the 
president’s personal protection. Having accompanied Johnson and his wife so often 
throughout their stay, Dame Zara Holt formed a mixed opinion of his personal bodyguards. 
Although Mrs Holt admired their dedication to Johnson, she also abhorred their callousness, 
claiming that it was ‘politically dangerous’ to behave with such disregard for the safety of the 
crowds.
356
 And when a detective suddenly appeared in the kitchen of the prime minister’s 
Lodge where the Johnsons and Holts dined on the first night of the visit, upsetting the staff 
with his incessant inspections and questioning why Mrs Holt was handling ‘“the president’s 
grill”’, Mrs Holt received an uncomfortable reminder that the status of the Johnsons 
commanded security procedures unlike anything to which she had previously been 
accustomed.
357
 The president’s attempt to ‘howdy’ four Vietnam veterans standing on guard 
with crossed arms and bowed heads at the Australian War Memorial epitomised Johnson’s 
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own inability to sense let alone adhere to the more ‘dignified procedures’ typical in 
Australia.
358
   
 
The president’s powerful office also inspired awe and fascination amongst Australians. In the 
Sydney Morning Herald, articles explained the authority vested in Johnson’s presidential role 
and gave a recount of a typical day in his life.
359
 More background to the president’s career 
was given by the Australian which described Johnson’s impressive legislative record in 
Congress.
360
 Much interest was also expressed in the paradoxes and contradictions of 
Johnson’s personality – the cruelty and compassion, the arrogance and sensitivity – and how 
these influenced his staff interactions and behaviour as president.
361
 That Johnson carried 
enormous responsibility was the message given by another article, which informed readers 
that at all times, ‘vital communication links’, including direct lines to the White House, 
Pentagon and State Department, and the hot line between the United States and Moscow, 
followed Johnson everywhere.
362
 For one Daily Mirror journalist, Johnson’s title and his 
embodiment of the American nation were enough to warrant courteousness from the 
Australian public:  
The great majority of Australians, whatever doubts some of them may hold about 
American policy in Vietnam, whatever reservations they may have about the pre-
election timing of the visit, will welcome President Johnson as the head of the most 
powerful nation in the world… By coming here he pays us a great compliment.363  
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The British high commissioner, too, observed that Australians were ‘flattered that so much 
attention should be paid to them by the most powerful man in the world’.364 Johnson’s 
possession of unrivalled political power was a significant factor explaining why many 
Australians ‘lost their heads’ in his presence.365  
 
The first lady was adored by the Australian media. In the lead up to the visit, the Courier 
Mail gave the assessment that Mrs Johnson was a competent and dutiful wife to the president, 
predicting also that she was quite simply ‘a woman Australians will like’.366 Noting her 
business intelligence and self-sufficiency, the Australian described how Lady Bird managed 
to accumulate significant wealth before Johnson’s political ascendency by investing in 
several Texan radio stations and a television station.
367
 This image of the autonomous Lady 
Bird was reinforced on both her visits to New Zealand and Australia, when her special 
interest in beautification and town planning allowed her to pursue activities separate from her 
husband whilst maintaining the tour’s focus on the public.368 For example, Lady Bird’s 
schedule included the planting of an Arizona cypress tree in front of crowds at Regatta Point 
in Canberra.
369
 Following Lady Bird’s departure, a feature in the Australian Women’s Weekly 
noted that her passion for beautification, initially denied serious consideration by the 
American press, eventually resulted in the passage of legislation through Congress.
370
 Thus 
Lady Bird was lauded as a consummate politician in her own right. In Woman’s Day 
magazine a week after the visit, Lady Bird was presented as ‘a part and extension of the man 
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she is married to’, conveying her as Johnson’s political partner as well as caring wife.371 Lady 
Bird’s independence and influence on the male-dominated political world invited 
comparisons with other politically active former first ladies. For the Australian, not even 
Eleanor Roosevelt ‘was so directly involved in government business’.372 That the president so 
heavily relied on Lady Bird was communicated in New York Times journalist James Reston’s 
compliment, published in the Australian, that ‘“Lyndon could never have made it this far 
without the help of [Lady Bird]”’.373 Significantly, despite Lady Bird’s success, the Women’s 
Weekly observed that she had ‘dignity’ but ‘no artificial pomp’.374 Both during and after the 
Johnsons’ tour of Australia, Australians expressed approval of the first lady’s crucial role in 
the president’s career and admiration for her own business achievements and political 
activism.  
 
The meet-and-greet with the Johnsons prompted reflections on their images in Australia. The 
Johnsons’ Texan folksiness certainly aroused the public’s curiosity. Reporter for the 
Australian Ian Moffitt, who spent some time in Washington before the visit, observed that 
Johnson’s ‘cowboy image’ was ‘striking’.375 Lady Bird’s ‘country flavoured Texan drawl’ 
was also ‘surprising’ according to Woman’s Day magazine.376 Playing on this cultural motif, 
recipes for a Texan style barbeque were provided in the Australian in light of the Lanyon 
Station barbeque organised by the American Embassy for Johnson and other diplomats.
377
 To 
this event, Johnson came dressed in ‘full Texan kit complete with everything except a six-
shooter’ whilst the other attendees followed their invitations’ suggestion to dress in ‘lounge 
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suits’.378 For some, the cowboy stereotype which Johnson worked gave the visit a hint of the 
contrived. Thus an Age journalist commented that Johnson was the ‘grassroots, homespun, 
extrovert, folksy, how ya’awl president’ whose ‘folksiness [was] perhaps just lightly over-
done’.379 Not all reporters, then, were devoted to perpetuating the Johnson-love. Questioning 
the honesty of Johnson’s earthy rancher demeanour, the British high commissioner’s view 
was that the tour gave the impression of ‘slightly bogus folksiness, of homely country 
manners served up as it were in cellophane for the consumption of big-city voters’.380 
However the British high commissioner did not deny that the tour was a ‘brilliant public 
relations success’.381 The tour redefined the conceptions of the president and his wife in the 
Australian public mind:  
The president was changed from a bellicose, crudely typical American politician to a 
wise, moderate father-figure seeking only peace and Asian brotherhood; Mrs Johnson 
was transformed from a sharp-faced businesswoman into a gracious figure full of 
Southern charm.
382
  
 
 
 
But the fact remains that the temporary euphoria experienced by Australians as a result of the 
physical presence in their country of the most powerful couple in the world did not translate 
into permanent longing to be more like Americans. Gerster and Bassett’s claim, that 
‘Australia was there for [Johnson’s] taking’  given the proportionally few protests during the 
visit and the obvious public affection for the Johnsons as human beings, treats the 
demonstrations that did occur and criticisms of the tour as negligible.
383
 The perception of 
unwarranted American involvement and arguably criminal conduct in Vietnam, as well as the 
visitors’ inattention to Australian procedural mores did nothing to endear to Australians the 
notion of having an American identity.  
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Chapter Four: Loyalty and Culture  
 
A central concern of this study has been to challenge the view that Australia’s foreign policy 
was not only subservient to Washington but that its entire cultural orientation had drifted 
from Britain to America. As Chapter One tried to show, at the time of Johnson’s three-day 
sojourn through Australia, British race patriotism was beginning to crumble under the weight 
of significant domestic and international pressures. At the same time, the influence of 
American popular culture, which had been strong for much of the twentieth century, was 
given a new momentum.
384
 Without the myth of Britishness to give meaning to Australians’ 
national identity, some commentators and intellectuals, such as Robin Boyd and Geoffrey 
Serle, feared that the American influence would permanently smother a weak Australian 
culture that was attempting to assert itself in the absence of the once dominant British race 
myth. According to historians Robin Gerster and Jan Bassett as well as Serle, many 
Australians were supposedly content to allow such a takeover.
385
 But a reassessment shows 
that these claims and fears have perhaps overlooked the reality that the infiltration of 
American popular and consumer culture occurred alongside Australians’ continuing 
attachment to Britishness. By considering the form taken by Americanisation in Australia in 
the 1960s together with Australians’ enduring cultural attachment to the Monarchy, this 
chapter draws two key conclusions about Australia’s cultural orientation at this time. The first 
is that the prevalence of American-style popular and consumer culture in Australia was not 
the result of Australians’ attempt to build a second-hand American identity in the wake of the 
collapse of the British racial myth. The second is that although Australian politicians saw the 
need to shelve the deferential rhetoric of empire, Australian civic culture and national identity 
                                                          
384
 White, ‘A Backwater Awash’, p. 108; Gerster and Bassett, Seizures of Youth, pp. 178-179; Roger Bell, ‘The 
American Influence’, p. 371.  
385
 Gerster and Bassett, Seizures of Youth, pp. 33-34; Serle, ‘Austerica Unlimited?’, p. 243.  
76 
 
remained anchored in Britishness.
386
 In short, although the idea of being ‘British’ was losing 
its once intense racial basis, Australians still saw themselves as very much in the British 
orbit.  
 
The term ‘Americanisation’ is used here in reference to its relationship with Australian 
culture. Rather than simply implying assimilation of one nation’s customs with those of the 
United States, Americanisation has been described by historian Richard White as ‘the 
fundamental reference points of a culture, and the extent to which they can be located in the 
United States rather than in the culture itself’.387 The concept refers not only to ‘the measure 
of American content, but its impact (if any) on behaviour and ways of thinking’.388 
Additionally ‘the examination of Americanisation should embrace not just the impact of 
Americanisation on popular culture, but its effect on the culture as a whole’.389 In other 
words, greater insight into the inroads that Americana had made on Australian culture by this 
time can be gained by considering the established cultural processes in Australia, and how 
they mediated or deflected American influences.
390
 For Boyd, it was the devotion of 
Australians in the architecture, design and advertisement industries to ‘the parrot’s imitation’ 
of the worst features of Americana that ensured Australian culture would sink ‘out of sight 
into the Pacific’.391 But Australian culture, underscored by Britishness, remained afloat. The 
continuum of Australians’ responses, from enthrallment to aversion, to American ways of 
thinking and behaving throughout the twentieth century, and most importantly in the Cold 
War period, always took place against the backdrop of Australians’ cultural Britishness.  
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Working out their ‘own civilisation’: Americanisation in Australia  
 
Several decades prior to the 1960s, Australians had found in American culture both laudable 
and deplorable features. Historian Richard Waterhouse has argued that before the First World 
War there was little fear that American culture, which had already made its mark on the 
theatre arts in Australia, posed a threat to the British customs Australians had adopted and 
adapted to their local context.
392
 In fact some political leaders such as Henry Parkes and 
Alfred Deakin saw America as a guide for Australia on the development of philanthropically-
funded social institutions.
393
 On the level of sentiment, Americans were seen as Australians’ 
familial relatives in the Pacific.
394
 For historian Neville Meaney, Australians, having been 
‘cut off from their [British] cultural roots’ for several generations, were brought back ‘into 
touch with their Anglo-Saxon cultural inheritance’ with the coming of America’s Great 
White Fleet to Sydney and Melbourne in August 1908.
395
 To a great extent the arrival of 
these vessels assuaged Australians’ fears of their nation’s geographic vulnerability to the 
perceived Japanese menace, but the visit also provided an opportunity for the ‘expression of 
Anglo-Saxon solidarity’.396 The bond of kinship espoused by leaders on both sides of the 
Pacific was matched by the widespread enthusiasm with which the Australians greeted the 
Americans.
397
 Additionally the American demonstration of naval strength was viewed by one 
Liberal senator as an exemplification of technological progress.
398
 At this time, then, America 
was seen as closely affiliated with Australia through their common British heritage and in 
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their shared occupation of the Pacific, and was even held up by some leaders as a model for 
the smaller nation. This view was voiced most clearly by Australian Labor Prime Minister 
William Hughes’ 1938 statement to Washington in which he proclaimed ‘What we are, you 
were; and what you are, we hope to be’.399 However between the First and Second World 
Wars, criticisms of American cultural influence in Australia from both conservative and left-
wing circles became harsher and more frequent.
400
 Censures from the right wing were often 
based on the moral depravity of American comics, magazines and films, and denounced 
cultural products associated with the American ‘Negro’.401 Radical nationalists also saw 
American culture as ‘“cheap”’, lamenting Australians’ ignorance of their own uniquely 
Australian artistic talents.
402
  
 
But these interactions with American culture were shallow compared to the encounters with 
hundreds of thousands of American troops on the Australian mainland from March 1941 til 
the end of the War. Meeting Americans in the flesh during this period marked the most 
sustained contact Australians had had with another culture since the gold rushes of the 
nineteenth century.
403
 To their male and female American visitors, Australians had varied 
responses, although the governments of both nations presented the relations as categorically 
cordial.
404
 Whilst the Americans occupied Australian cities, ‘“Americamania”’ spread like 
wildfire: the people of the nation Australians had seen in Hollywood movies were suddenly 
on their very doorstep.
405
 However, anti-American prejudices often accompanied person-to-
person interactions. Emphasising the dissimilarities between the guests and hosts, historians 
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E Daniel Potts and Annette Potts have claimed that during the ‘friendly invasion’, ‘at all 
levels misunderstandings, emphasising different national practices, occurred’.406 Australians 
and Americans locked horns over issues of romance and the relative affluence of the 
American GIs, with disagreements occasionally sparking physical confrontations and even 
fatal brawls.
407
 Tension also arose over the presence on the Australian mainland of African 
Americans, who directly confronted the fierce commitment to White Australia by Australian 
governments since Federation.
408
 Dramatic as this period of cultural exposure was, in contrast 
the legacy of the American presence during the War was ambivalent. In the realm of popular 
culture, the impact of the American presence was virtually untraceable. White has shown that 
there was ‘no noticeable increase’ in American content or styles in the film industry or 
popular media following the departure of the visiting war-service men and women.
409
 
Moreover, the extent to which the influx of American troops led Australians to assess their 
communal identity as a nation has been deemed significant but limited by historians. Potts 
and Potts have taken the most assured view in asserting that interactions with Americans 
‘undoubtedly created a new awareness among Australians of themselves as a distinct people, 
able to import and adapt cultural baggage from Britain, the US or elsewhere, but still… able 
to take their country on its own way and to “work out its own civilisation”’.410 And although 
historians Philip and Roger Bell have argued that the American occupation of Australian soil 
‘encouraged Australians to define, or to redefine, their sense of nationality in relation to a 
major, ethnically “European” nation other than the United Kingdom’, there was also ‘little 
evidence to show that the war generated fresh, new understandings of Australians themselves 
or of their visitors’.411 The forced temporary intimacy of the Australian and American 
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peoples did not produce change in Australian culture, nor did it bring the governments of the 
two nations closer together in the immediate post-war period.
412
 Indeed in this period 
Australian governments failed to get the Truman administration on board for a mutual 
defence agreement in the Pacific, and Truman even rebuffed Labor minister Dr Herbert Vere 
Evatt’s plea for a presidential statement of support for Australian security.413      
 
A new stage in the life of the Australian-American alliance commenced with the advent of 
the Cold War. As Chapter One has detailed, at this time Australian governments actively 
sought integration with American systems of ideology, consumerism and popular culture. For 
Roger Bell, this process reflected the ‘broadly shared living conditions and political traditions 
of the two societies and, of course, their shared language’.414   
 
As Australians began identifying the Liberal party with the future and aspirations of 
American-style living, the coalition’s monopoly on alliance management became tied to its 
ability to guide Australia towards a more Americanised economy and to facilitate a consumer 
culture.
415
 Australian radio and television were dominated by American content in the 1960s, 
and fashions and fads from across the Pacific gripped Australian youths.
416
 The motor car, 
one of the hallmarks of modern American culture, not only changed the way Australians 
travelled but was also the invention around which they designed facilities like supermarkets 
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and the drive-in cinema.
417
 Notwithstanding Australians’ hunger for American products, they 
were not passive recipients of a transfer of culture from their senior ally.
418
 Local forces 
negotiated concepts imported from across the Pacific.
419
 One example was the Australian-
made television series Homicide, an interpretation of the forensic science/crime fiction 
television genre.
420
 Nevertheless criticisms of what was seen to be a corrosive American 
influence were made at the time by the public commentator Horne, architect Boyd and 
historian Serle. Additionally the rapid growth of American shareholdings in the Australian 
economy in the 1960s was opposed by Labor parliamentarian Tom Uren who, on behalf of 
what he labelled a ‘wide section of the Australian community’, bemoaned the apparent ‘loss 
of [Australia’s] heritage to United States investment’.421 For the majority, though, the 
intensification of Americanisation in the Cold War was largely perceived as a tolerable 
‘price’ to pay for closer alignment with the United States – the so-called protector of 
freedom.
422
  
 
Viewing Americanisation as part of the broader process of modernisation challenges 
historians Gerster and Bassett’s argument that Johnson’s visit was an exercise in cultural 
imperialism and that Australians’ rapturous reception of the president reflected their 
culturally subservient mindset.
423
 In contrast to Gerster and Bassett’s claim that Australians 
latched onto American-inspired ideas and items because of an obsession with anything 
American, academic Mark Rolfe has argued that Australians ‘have loved whatever is 
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“modern”, which has often meant “American”’.424 Additionally, Roger Bell has understood 
Americanisation as the central component in the Westernisation of the modern world.
425
 In 
European nations such as France, as in Australia, changes occurred in the industrial, 
economic and commercial sectors, and lifestyles were accommodated that were linked with 
America.
426
 Together, these were ‘uniquely placed’ as the ‘rational alternative to 
authoritarian communism’.427 Buying into American popular and consumer culture was 
therefore neither imposed on Australians by a domineering America nor an attempt by 
Australians to construct an identity of themselves as American.
428
 By following White’s 
suggestion to divorce the proliferation of American cultural forms in Australia from debates 
about Australia’s national identity, an alternative interpretation can be given to Gerster and 
Bassett’s inference that the crowd turnouts for Johnson were evidence of an Australian 
community grovelling at the feet of their ‘de facto leader’.429 Rather, as the Courier Mail 
explained, meeting Johnson at the various welcome parades gave Australians ‘the opportunity 
to show [their] gratitude with warmth and courtesy’ for American protection in the Second 
World War as well as for ‘the contribution’ which America continued to make, particularly in 
communist hotspots, ‘for the well-being of the world’.430 Although these tumultuous displays 
by Australians in October 1966 were perceived by the British high commissioner in Australia 
as the ‘public crystallisation’ of Australian-American relations since World War Two, for 
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historian David McLean, expressions of alliance hysteria by Australians was rooted in fears 
of Asia that had arisen long before that War.
431
 Thus:  
the impulse behind Johnson’s welcome in 1966 was similar to that underlying the 
reception of the Great White Fleet: in both cases the fervour of the response expressed 
goodwill and gratitude towards a culturally-related great power to which Australians 
looked for protection in a threatening region.
432
  
 
By the time Johnson arrived in Australia, Australians of all social classes had been 
appropriating American concepts, novelties and trends for decades,
 
but the claim that 
Americanisation had ‘conquered’ Australia is to deny Australians any agency at all in the 
process.
433
 It has been shown here and in Chapter One that elements of American culture 
were rejected by Australians. And although Johnson’s visit coincided with an arguably 
unprecedented saturation of Australia’s popular culture with American items and American-
derived modes, differences between the Pacific allies’ cultural norms were emphasised 
privately by Australian and British leaders. When these critiques and cultural differences are 
considered along with the observations made by Zara Holt and Johnson’s insensitivity to 
Australian procedural mores elaborated in Chapter Three, as well as the evidence below, it is 
clear that many Australians who identified with the racial myth of Britishness continued to 
show greater commonalities with the British than the Americans.  
 
Enduring cultural sentiment: Britishness 
 
On an individual and cultural level, President Lyndon Johnson was considered out of step 
with Australian ways of thinking, contributing to the view that Australian culture resonated 
more with Britain than America. Visiting the White House prior to the president’s Pacific 
tour, Johnson asked Australian Treasurer Bill McMahon to deliver the message that Harold 
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Holt was ‘the sort of man [he’d] like to get down behind a log with’.434 After McMahon 
explained that he could not deliver that message because the American’s expression would be 
interpreted rather differently in Australia, Johnson instead described Australians as ‘good 
people to go to the well with’.435 In a separate instance, speaking of their personal 
relationship Holt confided to the British high commissioner that although Johnson ‘probably 
[meant] more’ to the Australian nation, it was ‘difficult to get on the same wavelength’ with 
the president and that Holt felt ‘personally far closer’ to British Prime Minister Harold 
Wilson.
436
 More than exemplifying the quirkiness of the Texan, these anecdotes were used by 
the British high commissioner to demonstrate deeper differences in cultural outlook between 
Australians and Americans.  
 
The overt and overflowing intimacy of the Australian-American alliance at the time of the 
Vietnam War, which was epitomised in Australia by thronging Johnson-obsessed crowds and 
the mutual affection between Johnson and Holt, moved some British officials to comment 
privately and publicly on the state of Australia’s relationships with Britain and the United 
States. The very fact that British diplomats were impelled to write on such matters is itself 
suggestive of the wider social and cultural climate that they were observing at this time. 
Tempting though it might be to dismiss such reflections as the idle jottings of bureaucrats 
trying furiously to maintain their credibility and relevance, they nevertheless offer the 
historian a unique insight into how the Australia-American relationship was viewed from the 
British perspective and the consequences the British saw for Anglo-Australian relations. The 
British high commissioner, reflecting on the luncheon held for the president at Lanyon 
Station in Canberra, admitted that ‘in the middle of this Vietnam-oriented Australian-
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American love-feast, the representative of the British government was decidedly the skeleton 
at the barbeque’.437 Insofar as this referred to Australian and American involvement in 
Vietnam without Britain, Johnston’s insight rang true. For Australia’s part, even as Holt 
endeavoured in 1967 to persuade British Prime Minister Wilson to reconsider withdrawal 
from east of Suez, any renewed efforts to intertwine Australia’s defence policy with Britain’s 
registered for the Australians as ‘faintly anachronistic’.438 But the British were concerned to 
present the essence of the British connection in Australia as unsullied. The British leader of 
the Opposition, Lord Carrington, on his own journey to Australia in the wake of the 
American president, publicly downplayed the significance of Australia’s increasing 
associations with America. To the Sydney Morning Herald Carrington remarked that ‘it is the 
most natural thing in the world for Australia to look to the United States, with all its power, 
when it comes to matters of defence’ but ‘the recent emphasis… on Australia’s relations with 
America – political, economic and military – does not mean that Australia is going American. 
The fact that Australia and America have strong ties is quite irrelevant to British relationships 
with Australia’.439 It is true that use of the term ‘irrelevant’ belied the role played by Britain’s 
inability to defend its dominion in motivating Australian attempts to enjoin America in a 
defence treaty.
440
 More importantly, however, Carrington spoke to the co-existence of strong 
Australian-American defence links with Australians’ enduring sense of affinity with Britain.  
 
Given the starkness of Australia’s defence relationships at the time – that is, Australia’s 
exclusive reliance on American protection – Carrington had referred to the residual appeal of 
British cultural sentiment in Australia. Even as the proponents of the ‘new nationalism’ 
sought to articulate an authentic Australian myth following the dissolution of British race 
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patriotism, the nation was not simply wiped clean of its British influences.
441
 These were 
entrenched in Australian society and continued to give shape and flow to intellectual and 
institutional life. As White has noted, ‘the universities, the professions, the parliament and 
law, the major protestant churches, the press and the book trade are all British institutions’.442 
The Australian people, too, had seemingly not abandoned the idea of themselves as ‘British’. 
In a letter to the Commonwealth Office in the United Kingdom three months after Johnson’s 
departure, British High Commissioner Johnston concluded that ‘British’ was still ‘a term 
which many, but by no means all, Australians regard as comprehending themselves’.443 As 
post-war immigration of non-British populations changed the complexion of Australia, the 
‘language of intense Britishness’ became less relevant, yet the Holt government clung to a 
‘homogeneous’ British culture as the unifying ideal for a cohesive Australian nation.444 
Writing as late as 1985, Potts and Potts have concluded that ‘the emotional attachment to the 
concept of being British is weaker, but persists’, not in the least because of the absence of any 
credible alternative to replace it.
445
  
 
No more ‘old style Royal tours’: The LBJ effect on the Australian Monarchy  
 
In the turbulent international environment of the 1960s, in which Britain initiated rapid 
decolonisation and its withdrawal into Europe, it is not surprising that the British government 
saw the need to re-examine particular assumptions about cultural belonging and loyalty in 
Commonwealth nations. This imperative was made all the more important in the case of 
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Australia given the potential meaning of the huge success of Johnson’s tour: that is, 
Australians’ exuberant welcome of the American president aroused the question of whether 
Australians’ allegiance to the British Throne had weakened.446 British High Commissioner 
Johnston’s evaluations of Australian attitudes towards Britishness and the Monarchy 
following the president’s visit included recommendations for future Royal tours, the 
Monarchy’s popularity amongst Australians, and predictions for the fate of the republic 
debate in Australia. Whilst Johnston’s observations were certainly in defence of Britain, they 
were a reminder that the tumult surrounding Johnson’s time in Australia denoted an 
ephemeral phase in the Australian-American alliance and did not reflect a nation that foresaw 
its future being entirely bound up in the American cultural sphere of influence.
447
   
 
The type of hyper-emotional displays by the Australian community that were seen during 
Johnson’s visit had previously been witnessed only in the presence of Royals. Yet Johnson’s 
casual, relaxed manner could not have contrasted more sharply with the rigidity of Royal 
tours. Even before Johnson had exited the country, an Age journalist saw that Johnson’s 
preference for informality ‘raises a question. Will the people who have enjoyed taking an 
active part in the LBJ Show be content with the passive role of dutiful audience in old-style 
Royal tours?’448 The answer from the British high commissioner was that the British 
government could no longer expect the ‘old-style’ Royal tour, with all the associated 
expenses, ‘over-formality’ and traffic disruptions to be enjoyed by Australians.449 Younger 
Australians particularly were less interested in ‘ceremonial’.450 They welcomed ‘working 
visits’ such as those made by Prince Philip in 1956, 1962 and 1965, but derived ‘special 
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gratification’ from the sight of a Royal family member enjoying themselves in the country – 
the visit of Princess Alexandra in 1959 and the Prince of Wales’ study exchange at a Geelong 
school in 1966 were notable examples.
451
 The 1963 Royal tour, having occurred only three 
years prior to Johnson’s visit, was a key point of reference for the British high commissioner 
gauging the direction of Australians’ loyalty compass. Johnston pointedly observed of the 
American president’s Australian journey that ‘press coverage, though prodigious, was 
actually no greater than that given to the first days of Her Majesty’s latest visit’.452 It 
followed for Johnston that Australians did not view a visit by the American president as 
having a more special place than that by the British Monarch in the collective mind.  
 
The Monarchy, according to Johnston, still enjoyed widespread popularity but there were 
notable variations of opinion of the institution within the Australian community. Those 
groups whose monarchical loyalty remained unquestionable included the armed forces, 
Returned Servicemen’s League and older Australians.453 Rural and remote areas of the land, 
too, were seen as bastions of Britishness apparently uninfected by Johnson fever. Johnston 
reassured the British government that ‘one hears stories of shearers and other people in the 
country area who said things like “if it was the Queen I would go in to see her, but B[ugger] 
Johnson”’.454 However, as historian Mark McKenna has noted, the Monarchy in Australia up 
to the 1960s was seen as a symbol of ‘racial purity’ and of the ideal of White Australia.455 
Thus the emotional connection to the Crown felt by those who took pride in its associations 
with Australia’s white, British status was, Johnston recognised, largely absent for many new 
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non-British migrants and younger Australians in the metropolises.
456
 And from within a ‘very 
small, but articulate, minority of intellectuals’, including Geoffrey Dutton and Horne,  
prolonged attachment to the Monarchy was execrated on the basis that it delayed Australia’s 
full realisation of nationhood.
457
  
 
Even with the arguments for an Australian republic gaining a certain momentum in this 
period, the Australian community had not been so concerned with or demonstrated such 
consistent commitment to the issue that constitutional change was seen as an immediate 
necessity.
458
 Johnson’s role as president and head of state did however encourage the British 
high commissioner to contemplate the attractiveness of Johnson’s dual office to Australians. 
Johnston noted that for some Australians, a head of state based overseas was considered 
impractical and unrepresentative of the independence gained from the ‘mother country’, 
particularly after her failure to defend Singapore in 1942 and her resistance to troop 
commitment to Vietnam.
459
 But it was the distinctiveness of Australians’ perspective in a 
different sense which made the election of a president seem like a rather un-Australian 
process for Johnston: ‘The Australians pride themselves on not being respecters of persons, 
particularly their own fellow countrymen. Their very irreverent attitude to the politicians 
suggests that it might be difficult for them to accept a local politician as a ceremonial 
president’.460 While Australians were impressed with Johnson, the British high commissioner 
could declare that they ‘were in no way convinced that republicanism was the right solution 
for them’ and that ‘the Monarchy as an element of dignity, stability and continuity would be 
hard to replace’.461  
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Assessing more broadly the quality of the Australian-British relationship once the waves of 
Johnson-related euphoria had passed, the British high commissioner informed his 
government that:  
there is no need for us to despair. The links which bind Australia and Britain are still 
strong. Australians are above all an independent-minded people. They have no wish to 
pass from British into American tutelage… The British connection so far has been a 
family affair, taken for granted and regarded as something solid if slightly boring.
462
  
 
Given the heightened importance of the American alliance for Australia’s security, Johnston 
felt that ‘now the Australians have a conscious motive for needing Britain to help hold the 
balance. We shall however have to work harder than ever to prove to the Australians that we 
are still around’.463 And indeed this suggestion was taken up by the British. With a focus on 
‘private business plus fun and relaxation’, the visit in early 1967 by Royal family members 
Princess Alexandra and her partner Angus Ogilvy was deemed by the British high 
commissioner to be an outstanding success.
464
 Australians, Johnston believed, were ‘pleased’ 
that members of the Royal family could enjoy a trip to Australia without ‘fuss and 
formality’.465   
 
Convincing the Australian government that it had not become a mere afterthought for the 
British was a less realistic task with Britain’s announced withdrawal of its forces from east of 
Suez, an irrevocable step towards the realisation of the United Kingdom’s destiny in Europe. 
Despite knowledge of an impending military exit from the region, Britain’s enunciations of 
its intentions in April 1967 generated seismic shockwaves in the Australian government.
466
 It 
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was not yet ready to adjust to what were seen by some as cataclysmic events.
467
 Therefore, 
even as Britain cut the final rope tethering it to its Pacific dominion, Australia’s cultural 
Britishness, to use historian Jeppe Kristensen’s phrase, endured ‘underneath the rubble of 
empire’.468  
 
It has been shown here that the argument that Britishness competed with Americanisation for 
cultural supremacy in Australia was an idea based on two false assumptions. First, that 
Australians have been culturally subservient to Britain and then America, following the 
demise of British power and the contemporaneous rise of America in the Pacific, and second, 
that the embrace of Johnson in October 1966 showed that Australia had succumbed to a 
dominating American influence in the Cold War. These assumptions have failed to 
acknowledge the potential for multi-layered loyalties within a nation whose dominant cultural 
legacy originated in Britain whilst its defence priorities, always arranged by governments 
with Australia’s independent national interests in mind, were bound up in the geopolitics of 
Southeast Asia. Australians’ acceptance of modernising and Americanising forces was seen 
as integral to winning the Cold War fight against communism. But not all Australians 
admired the cultural output of America. Nor did all Australians, as the anti-Vietnam and anti-
American protests during Johnson’s visit revealed, perceive America as a nation worthy of 
emulation. Confusion and disillusion over Australia’s national identity in this era did not give 
rise to an attempt to replicate American institutions or rituals. In this period and indeed 
beyond it, an idea of Britishness tied less and less to race and more to pride in a shared 
heritage and history continued to inform Australia’s political and civic culture.469    
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Conclusion 
 
President Lyndon Johnson arrived in Australia at a critical juncture in the nation’s history, 
which has made the occasion particularly useful for what it can tell historians about 
Australia’s experience of the Cold War. The Macmillan government’s applications for entry 
into the Common Market in 1961 and 1963, an unexpected renege on previous British claims 
of the EEC’s incompatibility with the Commonwealth’s trade preferences, were the nails in 
the coffin of the British defence connection.
470
 Australia was thus pushed further under the 
protective wing of America. Beginning with the announcement in early 1965 that Australian 
troops would be assigned to the Vietnam warzone, the public face of the Australian-American 
political alliance over the next two years was given a particularly shiny veneer. Johnson’s 
tour of October 1966 was the apogee of the alliance, but it was a transient phenomenon. The 
effusive rhetoric of the visit was not matched by the Australian government in deed.  Prime 
Minister Harold Holt demonstrated that he was not prepared to throw Australia’s economic 
and military heart and soul into Vietnam as America had done, despite the closer proximity of 
Asia to Australia than the United States. Holt was committed to utilising the alliance to 
secure Australian security. Therefore, contrary to the view purported by historians such as 
Robin Gerster and Jan Bassett, the Holt government cannot be accused of derogating 
Australia’s national interest out of deference to the United States.  
 
This thesis has attempted to use the Johnson visit as a window onto the cultural aspect of 
Australia’s foreign relations with both Britain and America in the Cold War. Australians’ 
responses to the war Johnson was waging in Vietnam revealed that the wider community was 
not totally pro-American, a fact which is often not emphasised given the generally euphoric 
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reactions to the president and first lady. At a time when Australian policymakers, 
intelligentsia and artists were searching for the source of a new binding national story in the 
absence of British race patriotism, it was significant that Australians knew that they were ‘not 
going American’.471  
 
The ‘American influence’ has long been interpreted as a danger to Australia’s 
independence.
472
 Rather than conceptualising Americanisation in terms of an imperialist 
assault to which Australians conceded defeat, however, Australia’s alacritous integration into 
American webs of defence, economics and popular culture might be seen more broadly as 
part of the nation’s attempt in this era to insulate itself against communism and its perceived 
threat to Western culture and mores. Australians were undoubtedly attracted to American 
music, films and fashions, and the 1960s saw the zenith of the popularity of these artworks 
and trends. The contention of this thesis, though, is that Americanisation must be divorced 
from discussions of national mythmaking. Instead, since the early twentieth century, these 
American-derived cultural developments have been part of the broader movement of 
modernisation, a process undertaken by other European nations abroad. The ‘Australian way 
of life’ – the sturdy framework into which modernising and Americanising elements were 
accommodated – was never under siege. And although many Australians were fascinated by 
Johnson’s status as head of the nation and chief executive of government, the republican 
debate had not so impassioned Australians that constitutional change resulted. There was no 
attempt by Australians to remake the nation in America’s image.  
 
In 1967, intellectual Geoffrey Serle wrote that conservative Australian leaders refused to 
‘recognise that American influence and penetration must have the effect of replacing the 
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popular sentiment for Britain. In a few years they will be sadly shaking their heads and 
wondering whatever happened to the British connexion’.473 Serle’s prophecy went 
unfulfilled. Time revealed that Britishness was entrenched in Australia’s political, 
institutional and civic culture. The Monarchy, too, retained its status as a symbol of 
Australia’s ongoing attachment to Britishness.  
  
What did not last, however, was the alliance intimacy of 1966. The ‘special relationship’ 
forged between Holt and Johnson inevitably ceased with Holt’s mysterious death at sea in 
December 1967.
474
 Not even Holt, though, was granted special access to Washington’s 
decision-making processes over Vietnam, and successive Australian prime ministers 
encountered the same problem.
475
 President Richard Nixon’s announcement in June 1969 of 
the speedy withdrawal of massive numbers of American troops from Vietnam caught the 
Gorton government in Australia by surprise.
476
 One month later, the president stated on the 
island of Guam – a speech which became known as the Nixon Doctrine – that America would 
never again become involved in a land war in Asia, and that America would now expect its 
allies to take the initial and major responsibility for their own defence.
477
 Without an 
American presence in the region, the Australian government’s Cold War strategy had 
collapsed. Elected as prime minister in 1972, Gough Whitlam was determined to treat the 
alliance less reverently than his Liberal party predecessors.
478
 Consequently, navigated by 
Nixon and Whitlam, the alliance ship entered into stormy seas. It was a fate for the alliance 
that neither Johnson nor Holt would have foreseen in the glowing immediate aftermath of the 
president’s Australian tour.    
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